1858.2 伟大的失败

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The Great Failure
“Living in a world in which days of golden and delusive dreams are rapidly succeeded by nights of monstrous nightmares and miseries, society loses its grasp upon the realities of life, and goes staggering blindly on towards a fatal degeneracy and dissolution.”

FEBRUARY 1858 ISSUE
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The crucial fact, in this epoch of commercial catastrophes, is not the stoppage of Smith, Jones, and Robinson, — nor the suspension of specie payments by a greater or less number of banks, — but the paralysis of the trade of the civilized globe. We have had presented to us, within the last quarter, the remarkable, though by no means novel, spectacle of a sudden overthrow of business, — in the United States, in England, in France, and over the greater part of the Continent.

At a period of profound and almost universal peace, — when there had been no marked deficit in the productiveness of industry, — when there had been no extraordinary dissipation of its results by waste and extravagance, — when no pestilence or famine or dark rumor of civil revolution had benumbed its energies, — when the needs for its enterprise were seemingly as active and stimulating as ever, — all its habitual functions are arrested, and shocks of disaster run along the ground from Chicago to Constantinople, toppling down innumerable well-built structures, like the shock of some gigantic earthquake.


Everybody is of course struck by these phenomena, and everybody has his own way of accounting for them; it will not, therefore, appear presumptuous in us to offer a word on the common theme. Let it be premised, however, that we do not undertake a scientific solution of the problem, but only a suggestion or two as to what the problem itself really is. In a difficult or complicated case, a great deal is often accomplished when the terms of it are clearly stated.

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It is not enough, in considering the effects before us, to say that they are the results of a panic. No doubt. there has been a panic, a contagious consternation, spreading itself over the commercial world, and strewing the earth with innumerable wrecks of fortune but that accounts for nothing, and simply describes a symptom. What is the cause of the panic itself? These daring Yankees, who are in the habit of braving the wildest tempests on every sea, these sturdy English, who march into the mouths of devouring cannon without a throb, these gallant Frenchmen, who laugh as they scale the Malakoff in the midst of belching fires, are not the men to run like sheep before an imaginary terror. When a whole nation of such drop their arms and scatter panic-stricken, there must be something behind the panic; there must be something formidable in it, some real and present danger threatening a very positive evil, and not a mere sympathetic and groundless alarm.


Neither do we conceive it as sufficiently expressing or explaining the whole facts of the case, to say that the currency has been deranged. There has been unquestionably a great derangement of the currency; but this may have been an effect rather than a cause of the more general disturbance; or, again, it may have been only one cause out of many causes. In an article in the first number of this magazine, the financial fluctuations in this country are ascribed to the alternate inflation and collapse of our factitious paper-money. Adopting the prevalent theory, that the universal use of specie in the regulation of the international trade of the world determines for each nation the amount of its metallic treasure, it was there argued that any redundant local circulation of paper must raise the level of local prices above the legitimate specie level, and so induce an excess of imports over exports; which imports can be paid for only in specie, — the very basis of the inordinate local circulation. Of course, then, there is a rapid contraction in the issue of notes, and an inevitable and wide-spread rupture of the usual relations of trade. But although this view is true in principle, and particularly true in its application to the United States, where trade floats almost exclusively upon a paper ocean, it is yet an elementary and local view; — local, as not comprising the state of facts in England and France and elementary, inasmuch as it omits all reference to the possibility of a great fluctuation of prices being produced by other means than an excess or deficiency of money.1 In France, as we know, the currency is almost entirely metallic, while in England it is metallic so far as the lesser exchanges of commerce are concerned; there is an obvious impropriety, therefore, in extending to the financial difficulties of those nations a theory founded upon a peculiarity in the position of our own.

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If, however, it be alleged that the disturbances there are only a reaction from the disturbances here, we must say that that point is not clear, and Brother Jonathan may be exaggerating his commercial importance. The ties of all the maritime nations are growing more and more intimate every year, and the trouble of one is getting to be more and more the trouble of the others in consequence; but as yet any unsettled balance of American trade, compared with the whole trade of those nations, is but as the drop in the bucket. John Bull, with a productive industry of five thousand millions of dollars a year, and Johnny Crapaud, with an industry only less, are not both to be thrown flat on their backs by the failure of a few millions of money remittances from Jonathan. The houses immediately engaged in the American trade will suffer, and others again immediately dependent upon them; but the disturbing shock, as it spreads through the widening circle of the national trade, will very soon be dissipated and lost in its immensity. That is, it will be lost, if trade there is itself sound, and not tottering under the same or similar conditions of weakness which produced the original default in this country; in which event, we submit, our troubles are to be considered as the mere accidental occasion of the more general downfall, — while the real cause is to be sought in the internal state of the foreign nations. Accordingly, let any one read the late exposures of the methods in which business is transacted among the Glasgow banks, the London discount-houses, and the speculators of the French Bourse, and he will see at a glance that we Americans have no right to assume and ought not to be charged with the entire responsibility of this stupendous syncope. Our bankruptcy has aggravated, as our restoration will relieve the general effects; but the vicious currency on this side the water, whatever domestic sins it may have to answer for, cannot properly be made the scapegoat for the offences of the other side of the water. The disasters abroad have occurred under conditions of currency differing in many respects from our own, and we believe that if there had been no troubles in America, there would still have been considerable troubles in England and France, as, indeed, the financial writers of both these countries long ago predicted from the local signs.


The same train of remark may he applied to those who impute the existing embarrassments to our want of a protective tariff; for, granting that to be an adequate explanation of our own difficulties, it is not therefore an adequate explanation of those in Europe. The external characteristics of the phenomena before us are everywhere pretty much the same, namely, — a prosperous trade gradually slackening, an increasing demand for money, depreciation and sacrifice of securities, numerous failures, disappearance of gold, panic, and the complete stagnation of every branch of labor; and it should seem that the cause or causes to be assigned for them ought also to be everywhere pretty much the same. At any rate, no local cause is in itself to be regarded as sufficient, unless it can be shown that such local cause has a universal operation. But who will undertake to contend that the absence of a protective system here is enough to prostrate both Great Britain and France, — the nations which the same theory supposes to have been chiefly benefited by such deficiency? The scheme of free trade is often denounced by its opponents as British free trade; but we respectfully suggest that if its operations lead to so serious a destruction of British interests as is now alleged, the phrase is at least a misnomer. No! as the characteristics of the crisis are common to the United States, England, and France, so the causes of that crisis are to be sought in something which is also common to the United States, England, and France.

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Now the one thing common to all these nations, and to all commercial nations, is the universal use of Credit, in the transactions of business. We conceive, therefore, that the existing condition of things may be most correctly and comprehensively described as a suspension of credit, and the consequent pressure for payment of immense masses of outstanding debt. This, we say, is the central fact, common to all the nations; and the solution of it, as a problem, is to be sought in some vice or disturbing element common to the general system, and not in any local incident or cause.


Credit has gained so enormous an extension within the last two centuries, that it may almost be pronounced the distinctive feature of modern times. It existed, undoubtedly, in ancient days, — for its correlative, Debt, existed; and we know, that, among the Jews, Moses enacted a sponging law, which was to he carried into effect every fifty years; that Solon, among the Greeks, began his administration with the Seisachtheia, or relief-laws, designed to rescue the poor borrowers from their overbearing creditors; and that the usurers were a numerous class at Rome, where also the Patrician houses were immense debtor-prisons. But in ancient times, when the chief source of wealth (aside from conquest and confiscation by the State) was the labor of slaves, and the principal exchanges were effected either by direct barter or the coined metals, the system of credit could not have been very complicated or general. As for the lending of money on interest, it appears to have been looked at askance by most of the ancients; and the prejudice against it continued, under the fostering care of the Church, far down into the Middle Ages. With the emancipation of the towns, however, with the splendid development of the Italian republics, with the noble commercial triumphs of the cities of the Hansa, credit was recovered from the hands of the Jews, and began a career of rapid and beneficent expansion. It was in an especial manner promoted by the magnificent prospects unfolded to colonial and mining enterprise in the discovery of the New World, by the stimulus and the facilities afforded to industrial skill by the researches of natural science, and by the emancipation won for all the activities of the human mind through the free principles of the Reformation. Thus, by degrees, credit came to intervene in nearly every operation of commerce and of social exchange, — from the small daily dealings of the mechanic at the shop, to the larger wholesale transactions of merchant with merchant, and to the prodigious expenditures and debts of imperial governments. Credit by note of hand, credit by book account, credit by mortgages and hypothecations, credit by bills of exchange, credit by certificates of stock, credit by bank-notes and post-notes, credit by exchequer and treasury drafts, credit, in short, in a thousand ways, enters into trade, filling up all its channels, turning all its wheels, freighting all its ships, coming down from the past, pervading the present, hovering over the future, reaching every nook and affecting every man and woman in the civilized world.

Such is the extent of credit; but let it be remarked in connection, that, in all these innumerable and multifarious forms of it, in all the stupendous interchanges of Mine and Thine, the ultimate reference is to one sole standard of value, which is the value of the precious metals. The civilized world has adopted these as the universal solvent of its vast masses of obligation. It is assumed that some standard is indispensable; it is asserted to be the imperative duty of governments, if they would not make their exactions of taxes arbitrary, unequal, and oppressive, — if they would render the dealings of individuals mutual and just, — if they would preserve the property and labor of their subjects from the merciless caprices of the powerful, and keep society from reverting to a more or less barbarous state, — to supply a fixed and equable money-measure; and the majority of the governments have selected gold and silver as the best. As seemingly less changeable in quantity and value than anything else, as imperishable, as portable, as divisible, as both convenient and safe, the precious metals challenge superiority over every other product; and accordingly every contract and every debt is resolvable into gold and silver. From this fact, the reader will see at once the prodigious significance of those materials in the economy of trade, and the prime necessity that they should be not only uniform in value, but so equally distributed that they may be easily attainable when needed. Every change in their value is a virtual change in the value of the vast variety of obligations which are measured and liquidated by them; and every apprehension of their scarcity or disappearance, by whatever cause excited, is an apprehension of embarrassment on the part of all those who have debts to pay or to receive.

But it happens that this standard is not an accurate standard. It does not stand, while other things alone move, but moves itself; its value is changeable, fluctuating from time to time according to the relation of supply and demand, and from place to place according to the perturbations of the trade of the world. Moreover, its very preëminence of function—the universality and the durability of its worth—renders it peculiarly sensitive to accidental influences, or to influences outside of the usual workings of trade. A great war or revolution occurring anywhere, the loss by tempests or frosts of an important staple, such as wheat or cotton, the fall and reaction consequent upon some great speculative excitement, are all likely to produce enormous drains or sequestrations of this valuable material. When the revolt of 1848 broke out in Italy, every particle of specie disappeared as effectually as if it had been thrown into the Adriatic or the mouth of Vesuvius; when the corn crop failed in England in 1846, the Bank of England lost ten millions of dollars in gold in less than nine days, and the country five times that in about a month; and in our own late experiences, with three hundred millions of gold among the people, we have seen it so put away, that no charm or bait could allure it from its hiding-places.

Need we go any farther, then, than these simple truths, to lay our finger on the primal fact which underlies all financial embarrassments and panics? The mass of the transactions in commerce rests upon credit; the solvent of that credit is gold; and gold has not only a sliding scale of value, but is apt to disappear when most wanted. While business is moving on in the ordinary way, it is more than ample for every purpose; but the moment any event arises, such as a rapidly falling market, inducing hurried sales, or a drain of specie, disturbing the general confidence, everybody gets apprehensive, everybody calls upon everybody for payment, and everybody puts everybody off, — till a feeling of sauve qui peut becomes universal.


If there were no currency anywhere but a metallic currency, this liability to sudden revulsions would still hang over trade, provided credit and paper tokens of credit continued to be the media of exchanges; and the instinctive or experimental perception of this truth, combined with other motives, is what has led men to their various attempts to provide a money substitute for gold and silver. Lycurgus, in Sparta, found it, as he supposed, in stamped leather; but modern wisdom has preferred paper. The degree of success attained by Lycurgus we do not know; but of the success of the moderns we do know, by some one hundred and fifty years of recurring disaster. There are some steeds that cannot be ridden; they are so fractious and intractable, that, put whom you will upon their back, he is thrown, and invent what snaffle or breaking-bit you may, they will not be held to an equable or moderate pace. And of this sort, judging by the past attempts, is Paper Money. All the ingenuity and efforts of the most skilful trainers of the Old World, and of the most cunning jockeys of the New, have been tasked in vain to devise an effective discipline and curb for this impatient colt. Paper Money either refuses to be ridden, and runs rampant away, or, if any one succeed in mounting him for a time, he performs a journey like that which Don Quixote took on the back of the famous Cavalino, or Winged Horse. In imagination he ascended to the enchanted regions, — but in reality he was only dragged through alternate gusts of fire and of cold winds, to find the horse himself, in the end, a mere depository of squibs and crackers.


Paper money has been issued, for the most part, on the one or the other of two conditions, namely: as irredeemable, when it has been made to rest on the vague obligation of some government to pay it some time or other in property; or as convertible into gold and silver on demand. But under both conditions it seems to have been impossible to preserve it from excess and consequent depreciation. Nothing would appear to be safer and sounder, on the face of it, than a money-obligation backed by all the responsibility and property of a government; and yet we do not recall a single instance in which an irredeemable government-money has been issued, where it did not sooner or later swamp the government beyond all hope of its redemption. No virtue of statesmanship is proof against the temptation of creating money at will. Even where there has been a nominal convertibility on demand of the bills of government banks, they have worked badly in practice. In 1637, for instance, the monarch of Sweden established the Bank of Stockholm; yet in a little while its issues amounted to forty-eight millions of roubles, and their depreciation to ninety-six per cent. In 1736, Denmark created the Bank of Copenhagen; but within, nine years from its foundation it suspended redemptions altogether, and its notes were depreciated forty-six per cent. We need not refer to the extraordinary issues of French assignats, or of American continental money, — nor to the deluges of paper which have fallen upon Russia and Austria. During all these experiments, the sufferings of the people, according to the different historians, were absolutely appalling. One of these experiments of paper money, however, begun under the most promising auspices, and on a professed basis of convertibility, was yet so stupendous and awful in its effects, that it has taken its place as a Pharos in History, and is never to be forgotten. We refer, of course, to the banking prodigalities of the Regency of France, undertaken in connection with the scheme known as Law’s Mississippi Bubble, — although the Bank and the Bubble were not essentially connected. We presume that our readers are acquainted with the incidents, because all the modern historians have described them, and because the more philosophical impute to them an active agency in the origination of that moral corruption and lack of political principle which hastened the advent of the great Revolution. Louis XIV. having left behind him, as the price of his glory, a debt of about a thousand millions of dollars, the French ministry, with a view to reduce it, ordered a recoinage of the louis-d’or. An edict was promulgated, calling in the coin at sixteen livres, to be issued again at twenty; but Law, an acute and enterprising Scotchman, suggested that the end might be more happily accomplished by a project for a bank, which he carried in his pocket. He proposed to buy up the old coin at a higher rate than the mint allowed, and to pay for it in bank-notes. This project was so successful that the Regent took it into his own hands, and then began an issue of bills which literally intoxicated the whole of France. No scenes of stock-jobbing, of gambling, of frenzied speculation, of reckless excitement and licentiousness ever surpassed the scenes daily enacted in the Rue Quincampoix; and when the bubble burst, the distress was universal, heart-rending, and frightful. With millions in their pockets, says a contemporary memoir, many did not know where to get a dinner; complaints and imprecations resounded on every side; some, utterly ruined, killed themselves in despair; and mysterious rumors of popular risings spread throughout Paris the terror of another expected St. Bartholomew.

In this case the phenomena were the more striking because they were gathered within a short compass of time, and took place among a people proverbial for the versatility and extravagance of their impressions. The French are an excitable race, who carry whatever they do or suffer to the last extreme of theatrical effect; and for that reason it might be supposed that the tremendous revulsions we have alluded to were owing in part to national temperament. But similar effects have been wrought, by similar causes, among the slower and cooler English, with whom commercial disturbances have been as numerous and as disastrous as among the French, only that they have been distributed over wider spaces of time, and controlled by the more sluggish and conservative habits of the nation. Some twenty years before Law made his approaches to the French Regent, another Scotchman, William Patterson, had got the ear of Macaulay’s hero, William, and of his ministers, and laid the foundations of the great Bank of England. It was chartered in 1694, on advances made to the government; and gradually, under its auspices, the vast system of English banking, which gives tone to that of the world, grew up. Let us see with what results; they may be expressed in a few words: every ten or fifteen years, a terrific commercial overturn, with intermediate epochs of speculation, panic, and bankruptcy.

We cannot here go into a history of this bank, nor of the various causes of its reverses; but we select from a brief chronological table, in its own words, some of the principal events, which are also the events of British trade and finance.

1694. The Bank went into operation.

1696. Bank suspended specie payments. Panic and failures.

1707. Threatened invasion of the Pretender. Run upon the Bank, — panic. Government helped it through, by guarantying its bills at six per cent.

1714. The Pretender proclaimed in Scotland. Run upon the Bank, — panic.

1718-20. Time of the South-Sea Bubble. Reaction, — demand for money, — Bank of England nearly swept away, — trade suspended, — nation involved in suffering.

1744. Charles Edward sails for Scotland, and marches upon Derby. Panic. Run upon the Bank, — is obliged to pay in sixpences, and to block its doors, in order to gain time.

1772. Extensive failures and a monetary panic. The Bank maintains the convertibility of its notes for several years, at an annual expense of £850,000.

1793. War with France, — drain of gold, — Bank contracts, — panic, — failures throughout the country, — universal hoarding, — one hundred country banks stop, notes as low as five pounds first issued, — general fall of prices.


1796. An Order in Council suspends specie payment by the Bank.

1799. Numerous failures, — chiefly on the Continent. The pressure in England relieved by an issue of Exchequer bills.

1807-9. Great speculations in flax, hemp, silk, wool, etc.

1810. Recoil of speculation, — extensive failures, and great demand for money.

1811. Parliament adopts a resolution declaring a one-pound note and a shilling legal tender for a guinea.

1814-16. Heavy losses and bankruptcies, — failure of two hundred and forty country banks, — the distress and suffering of the people compared to that in France after the bursting of the Mississippi Scheme.

1819. Law passed for the resumption of specie payments in 1823, — after a suspension of twenty-seven years.

1822. Great commercial depression throughout Europe, — agricultural distress, — famine in Ireland.

1824. Speculations in scrips and shares of foreign loans and new companies, to a fabulous amount.

1825. Recoil of the speculations, — run upon the banks, — seventy banks stop, — a drain of gold exhausts the bullion of the Bank.

1826. Depression of trade, — government advances Exchequer bills to the Bank.

1832. A run for gold, — bullion in the Bank again alarmingly reduced.

1834-7. Jackson vs. Biddle in America produces considerable derangements in England, — drain of gold, — great alternate contractions and expansions, — severe mercantile distress.

1844. Renewal of the Bank Charter, limiting its issues, — great speculations in railroad shares, to the amount of £500,000 000.

1845. Recoil of the speculations, — immense sacrifice of property.

1846. Drain of gold, — large importations of corn, — alarm.


1847. Drain of gold continues, — panic and universal mercantile depression, Bank refuses discounts, — forced sales of all kinds of property, — the Bank Charter suspended.

1857. The experiences of 1847 repeated on a more injurious scale, with another suspension of the Bank Charter Act.

Now this record does not show a brilliant success in banking; it does not encourage the hopes of those who place great hopes in a national institution; for the Bank of England is the highest result of the financial sagacity and political wisdom of the first commercial nation of the globe. A recognized ally of the government, — at the very centre of the worlds trade, — enjoying a large freedom of movement within its sphere, — conducted by the most eminent merchants of the metropolis, assisted by the advice of the most accomplished political economists, — sanctioned and amended, from time to time, by the greatest ministers, from Walpole to Peel, — it has had, from its position, its power, and the talent at its command, every opportunity for doing the best things that a bank could do; and yet behold this record of periodical impotence! Its periodical mischiefs we leave out of the account.

In the United States, we have suffered from similarly recurring attacks of financial epilepsy; we have tried every expedient, and we have failed in each one we have had three national banks; we have had thousands of chartered banks under an infinity of regulations and restrictions against excesses and frauds; and we have had, as the appropriate commentary, three tremendous cataclysms, in which the whole continent was submerged in commercial ruin, besides a dozen lesser epochs of trying vicissitude. The history of our trade has been that of an incessant round of inflations and collapses; and the amount of rascality and fraud perpetrated in connection with the banks, in order to defeat the restrictions upon them, has no parallel but in the sponging-houses. A Belgian philosopher, from the study of statistics, has deduced a certain order in disorder, — or a law of periodicity in the recurrence of murders, suicides, crimes, and illegitimate births; and it appears that a similar regularity of irregularity might be easily detected in our cyclic hank explosions.


With the sad experiences of other nations before us, — with the rocks of danger standing high out of the water, and covered all over with the fragments of former wrecks, we have yet persisted in following the old wretched way. What a humiliating confession! what a comment on the alleged practical discernment of this practical people! what a text for radicals, socialists, and all sorts of Utopian dreamers! If the mischiefs of these monetary aberrations were confined to a mere loss of wealth,2 which is proverbial for its winged uncertainty, we might regard them as a seeming admonition of Providence against putting too much trust in riches; but they are to be considered as something infinitely worse than mere reverses of fortune: the disorders they generate shake the very foundations of morals; and while shattering the industry, they undermine the economy and frugality and rend the integrity of mankind. We doubt whether any of the great forms of evil incident to our imperfect civilization—the slave-trade, debauchery, pauperism—cause more individual anguish or more public detriment than these incessant revolutions in the value and tenure of property. Those afflict limited classes alone, but these every class; they relax and pervert the whole moral regimen of society; and if, as it is sometimes alleged, the present age is more profoundly steeped in materialism than any before, — if its enterprise is not simply more bold, but more reckless and prodigal, — if the monitions of conscience have lost their force in practical affairs, and the dictates of religion and honor alike their sanctity, it is because of the uncertain principle, the gambling spirit, the feverish eagerness, and the insane extravagance, which beset the ways of traffic. Living in a world in which days of golden and delusive dreams are rapidly succeeded by nights of monstrous nightmares and miseries, society loses its grasp upon the realities of life, and goes staggering blindly on towards a fatal degeneracy and dissolution.


The question, then, is, whether this melancholy march of things should be allowed to proceed, or whether we should strive to do better. Our good sense, our moral sense, our progressive instincts, conspire with our interests in proclaiming that we ought to do better; but how shall we do better? “Why,” reply the great Democratic doctors, — Mr. Buchanan, the President, and Mr. Benton, the Nestor of the people, — “suppress the issue of small bank-notes!” Well, that nostrum is not to be despised; there would be some advantages in such a measure; it would, to a certain extent, operate as a check upon the issues of the banks; it would enlarge the specie basis, by confining the note circulation to the larger dealers, and so exempt the poorer and laboring classes from the chances of bank failures and suspensions. But if these gentlemen suppose that the extrusion of small notes would be in any degree a remedy for overtrading, or moderate in any degree the disastrous fluctuations of which everybody complains, they have read the history of commerce only in the most superficial manner. Speculations, overtrading, panics, money convulsions, occur in countries where small notes are not tolerated, just as they do in countries where they are; and they occur in both without our being able to trace them always to the state of the currency. The truth is, indeed, that nearly all the great catastrophes of trade have occurred in times and places when and where there were no small notes. Every one has heard of the tulip-mania of Holland, — when the Dutchmen, nobles, farmers, mechanics, sailors, maid-servants, and even chimney-sweeps and old-clotheswomen, dabbled in bulbs, — when immense fortunes were staked upon the growth of a root, and the whole nation went mad about it, although there was never a bank nor a paper form yet in existence. Every one has heard of the great South-Sea Bubble in England, in 1719, when the stock of a company chartered simply to trade in the South Seas rose in the course of a few weeks to the extraordinary height of eight hundred and ninety per cent., and filled all England with an epidemic frenzy of gambling, so that the recoil ruined thousands upon thousands of persons, who dragged down with them vast companies and institutions. Yet there was not a bank-note in England, at that time, for less than twenty pounds, or nearly a hundred dollars.


More recent revulsions are still more to the point. In 1825, in England, there were enormous speculations in joint-stock enterprises and foreign loans. Some five hundred and thirty-two new companies were formed, with a nominal capital of about $2,200,000,000, and Greek, Austrian, and South American loans were negotiated, to the extent of $275,000,000. Scarcely one of these companies or of these loans ever paid a dividend; and the consequence was a general destruction of credit and property, and a degree of distress which was compared to the terrible sufferings inflicted by the Mississippi and the South-Sea Bubbles. Yet there were no bank-notes in circulation in England under five pounds, or twenty-five dollars. Again, our readers may recall the monstrous overtrading in railroad shares in the years 1845-6. Projects involving the investment of £500,000,000 were set on foot in a very little while; the contagion of purchasing spread to all the provincial towns; the traditionally staid and sober Englishman got as mad as a March hare about them; Mr. Murdle reigned triumphant; and, in the end, the nation had to pay for its delirium with another season of panic, misery, and ruin. Yet during all this excitement there were not only no small notes in circulation, but, what is most remarkable, there was no unusual increase in the issues of the banks, of any kind.

Let us not hope too much, therefore, from the suppression of small notes, should that scheme be carried into effect; let us not delude ourselves with the expectation that it will prove a satisfactory remedy, in any sense, for the periodical disease of the currency; for its benefits, though probable, must be limited.3 It is a remedy which merely plays round the extremities of the disorder, without invading the seat of it at all.


We have endeavored, in the foregoing remarks, to point out (for our limits do not allow us to expound) two things: first, that in the universal modern use of credit as the medium of exchanges, — which credit refers to a standard in itself fluctuating, — there is a liability to certain critical derangements, when the machinery will be thrown out of gear, if we may so speak, or when credit will dissolve in a vain longing for cash; and, second, that in the paper-money substitutes which men have devised as a provision against the consequences of this liability, they have enormously aggravated, instead of counteracting or alleviating the danger. But if these views be correct, the questions to be determined by society are also two, namely: whether it be possible to get rid of these aggravations; and whether credit itself may not be so organized as to be self-sufficient and self-supporting, whatever the vagaries of the standard. The suppression of small notes might have a perceptible effect in lessening the aggravations of paper, but it would not touch the more fundamental point, as to a stable organization of credit. Yet it is in this direction, we are persuaded, that all reformatory efforts must turn. Credit is the new principle of trade, — the nexus of modern society; but it has scarcely yet been properly considered. While it has been shamefully exploited, as the French say, it has never been scientifically constituted.

Neither will it be, under the influence of the old methods, — not until legislators and politicians give over the business of tampering with the currency, — till they give over the vain hope of “hedging the cuckoo,” to use Locke’s figure, — and the principle of freedom he allowed to adjust this, as it has already adjusted equally important matters. Let the governments adhere to their task of supplying a pure standard of the precious metals, and of exacting it in the discharge of what is due to them, if they please; but let them leave to the good sense, the sagacity, and the self-interest of Commerce, under the guardianship of just and equal laws, the task of using and regulating its own tokens of credit. Our past experiments in the way of providing an artificial currency are flagrant and undeniable failures; but as it is still possible to deduce from them, as we believe, ample proof of the principle, that the security, the economy, and the regularity of the circulation have improved just in the degree in which the entire money business has been opened to the healthful influences of unobstructed trade, — so we infer that a still larger liberty would insure a still more whole. some action of the system. The currency is rightly named the circulation, and, like the great movements of blood in the human body, depends upon a free inspiration of the air.


Under a larger freedom, we should expect Credit to be organized on a basis of mutual responsibility and guaranty, which would afford a stable and beautiful support to the great systolic and disastolic movements of trade; that it would reduce all paper emissions to their legitimate character as mere mercantile tokens, and liberate humanity from the fearful debaucheries of a factitious money; and that Commerce, which has been compelled hitherto to sit in the markets of the world, like a courtesan at the gaming-table, with hot eye and panting chest and painted cheeks, would he regenerated and improved, until it should become, what it was meant to be, a beneficent goddess, pouring out to all the nations from her horns of plenty the grateful harvests of the earth.

A failure of one half the cotton or wheat crop, we suspect, would play a considerable part among “the prices,” whatever the state of the note circulation. ↩
Yet this is not to be lightly estimated. Seaman, in his Progress of Nations, says the direct losses by paper money, within the last century and a half, have equaled $2,000,000,000. ↩
It is very curious, that, while our leaders are in favor of exorcising small notes, many of the French and English liberals are calling for an issue of them! ↩




伟大的失败
"生活在这样一个世界里，金色的和虚幻的梦想的日子很快就被可怕的噩梦和痛苦的夜晚所取代，社会失去了对生活现实的把握，盲目地走向致命的堕落和解体。"

1858年2月号
补助
在这个商业灾难的时代，关键的事实不是史密斯、琼斯和罗宾逊的停业，也不是或多或少的银行暂停支付纸币，而是文明世界贸易的瘫痪。在过去的一个季度里，我们看到了令人瞩目的，尽管绝非新奇的，商业突然被推翻的景象，在美国，在英国，在法国，以及在欧洲大陆的大部分地区。

在一个深刻和几乎普遍的和平时期，在工业生产力没有明显不足的时候，在工业成果没有因浪费和奢侈而特别消散的时候，在没有瘟疫或饥荒或国内革命的黑暗传言使其精力疲惫的时候。- 当对其事业的需求似乎像以往一样活跃和刺激时，它的所有惯常功能都停止了，灾难的冲击沿着地面从芝加哥到君士坦丁堡，像一些巨大的地震的冲击一样，把无数精心建造的结构推倒。


当然，每个人都会受到这些现象的冲击，每个人都有自己的解释方式；因此，我们就共同的主题发表意见，不会显得冒失。然而，我们的前提是，我们不承诺对问题进行科学的解决，而只是对问题本身到底是什么提出一两个建议。在一个困难或复杂的案例中，如果明确说明了其中的条件，往往能取得很大的成就。

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在考虑我们面前的影响时，仅仅说它们是恐慌的结果是不够的。毫无疑问，有一种恐慌，一种具有传染性的惊愕，在商业世界中蔓延开来，在地球上散布着无数的财富残骸，但这并不能说明什么，而只是描述一种症状。恐慌本身的原因是什么？这些大胆的美国佬，他们习惯于在每一个海域冒着最狂野的风暴，这些结实的英国人，他们毫无畏惧地走进吞噬性大炮的口中，这些英勇的法国人，他们在熊熊大火中笑着爬上马拉科夫，他们不是像绵羊一样在想象中的恐怖面前逃跑的人。当整个国家的人都放下武器，惊慌失措地四散奔逃时，惊慌的背后一定有什么东西；一定有什么可怕的东西，一定有一些真实的、现实的、威胁着非常积极的邪恶的危险，而不仅仅是一种同情的、没有根据的惊慌。


我们也不认为说货币已经失调就能充分地表达或解释整个案件的事实。毫无疑问，货币发生了巨大的混乱；但这可能是更普遍的骚乱的结果，而不是原因；或者，这可能只是许多原因中的一个原因。在本杂志第一期的一篇文章中，这个国家的金融波动被归咎于我们的虚假纸币的交替膨胀和崩溃。采用流行的理论，即在调节世界国际贸易中普遍使用纸币决定了每个国家的金属财富的数量，文章认为，任何多余的本地纸币流通必须使本地价格水平高于合法的纸币水平，从而导致进口超过出口；这些进口只能用纸币支付，这是过度的本地流通的根本基础。当然，这样一来，纸币的发行就会迅速萎缩，通常的贸易关系就会不可避免地广泛破裂。但是，尽管这种观点在原则上是正确的，而且在适用于美国时尤其正确，因为美国的贸易几乎完全在纸上漂浮，但它仍然是一种基本的和局部的观点；局部的，因为它不包括英国和法国的事实状况；基本的，因为它完全没有提到价格的巨大波动是由货币的过剩或不足以外的其他手段产生的可能性1。我们知道，在法国，货币几乎完全是金属的，而在英国，就较小的商业交换而言，货币也是金属的；因此，把建立在我们国家地位的特殊性上的理论扩展到这些国家的财政困难，显然是不恰当的。

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然而，如果有人指称那里的骚乱只是这里的骚乱的反应，我们必须说，这一点并不明确，乔纳森兄弟可能夸大了他的商业重要性。所有海洋国家的联系每年都在日益密切，一个国家的麻烦越来越多地成为其他国家的麻烦；但迄今为止，美国贸易的任何不稳定的平衡，与这些国家的全部贸易相比，都只是杯水车薪。约翰-布尔和约翰尼-克拉克帕德都有年产五亿美元的产业，而约翰尼-克拉克帕德的产业则更少，他们不会因为来自乔纳森的几百万美元汇款的失败而被甩在身后。直接从事美国贸易的企业会受到影响，其他企业也会立即依赖它们；但这种令人不安的冲击，随着它在全国贸易范围内不断扩大，很快就会在其巨大的范围内消散和消失。也就是说，如果那里的贸易本身是健全的，而不是在产生本国最初违约的相同或类似的软弱条件下摇摇欲坠，那么它就会消失；我们认为，在这种情况下，我们的麻烦应被视为更普遍的衰落的偶然事件，而真正的原因应在外国的内部状态中寻找。因此，让任何一个人读一读最近对格拉斯哥银行、伦敦贴现所和法国交易所的投机者之间的交易方法的揭露，他就会明白，我们美国人无权承担也不应该被指控对这种巨大的同步现象承担全部责任。我们的破产加剧了，而我们的恢复将缓解普遍的影响；但水一方的恶性货币，无论它在国内有什么罪过，都不能成为水另一方的罪行的替罪羊。国外的灾难是在与我们的货币条件有许多不同之处的情况下发生的，我们相信，如果美国没有麻烦，英国和法国仍然会有相当大的麻烦，事实上，这两个国家的金融作家早就从当地的迹象中预测到了。


对于那些把现有的困难归咎于我们缺乏保护性关税的人，也可以采用同样的说法；因为，如果说这是对我们自己的困难的充分解释，那么它就不是对欧洲困难的充分解释。摆在我们面前的现象的外部特征在任何地方都是基本相同的，即：繁荣的贸易逐渐衰退，对货币的需求不断增加，证券的贬值和牺牲，众多的失败，黄金的消失，恐慌，以及每个劳动部门的完全停滞；看来，为它们指定的原因也应该是在任何地方都是基本相同的。无论如何，除非能证明这种局部原因具有普遍性，否则任何局部原因本身都不能被认为是充分的。但是，有谁敢说，这里没有保护制度就足以使英国和法国一蹶不振，而这两个国家正是同一理论所认为的主要受益于这种缺陷的国家？自由贸易计划经常被其反对者谴责为英国自由贸易；但我们恭敬地建议，如果它的运作导致了现在所称的对英国利益的如此严重的破坏，那么这个词至少是个错误的名称。不！由于危机的特点是美国、英国和法国所共有的，所以要从美国、英国和法国也共有的东西中寻找该危机的原因。

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现在，所有这些国家以及所有商业国家都有一个共同点，那就是在商业交易中普遍使用信贷。因此，我们认为，现有的情况可以最正确和全面地描述为信贷暂停，以及随之而来的大量未偿债务的支付压力。我们说，这是所有国家共同的核心事实；作为一个问题的解决方案，应该在一般系统中共同的一些弊端或干扰因素中寻找，而不是在任何局部的事件或原因中寻找。


在过去的两个世纪里，信用得到了如此巨大的扩展，以至于它几乎可以被宣布为现代社会的独特特征。毫无疑问，它在古代是存在的，因为它的对应物--债务--是存在的；我们知道，在犹太人中，摩西颁布了一项海绵法，该法每五十年实施一次；在希腊人中，索伦以Seisachtheia或救济法开始他的管理，旨在将贫穷的借款人从霸道的债权人那里拯救出来；在罗马，高利贷者是一个众多的阶层，那里的贵族之家也是巨大的债务人监狱。但在古代，当财富的主要来源（除了国家的征服和没收）是奴隶的劳动，而主要的交换是通过直接的易货贸易或硬币的金属来实现时，信贷系统不可能非常复杂或普遍。至于借钱生息，大多数古人似乎都不屑一顾；在教会的鼓励下，对它的偏见一直持续到中世纪。然而，随着城镇的解放，随着意大利共和国的辉煌发展，随着汉萨城市的高贵的商业胜利，信用从犹太人手中恢复了，并开始了快速和有益的扩张生涯。新世界的发现为殖民和采矿企业展现了宏伟的前景，自然科学的研究为工业技能提供了刺激和便利，宗教改革的自由原则为人类的所有活动赢得了解放，这些都以一种特别的方式促进了信用。因此，随着时间的推移，信贷几乎介入了商业和社会交换的每一项活动，从机械师在商店的日常小交易，到商人与商人之间的大型批发交易，以及帝国政府的巨大开支和债务。通过手票的信用，通过账簿的信用，通过抵押和质押的信用，通过汇票的信用，通过股票的信用，通过银行票据和邮政票据的信用，通过国库和国库汇票的信用，总之，信用以千百种方式进入贸易，填满它的所有渠道，转动它的所有车轮，装载它的所有船只，从过去下来，渗透到现在，盘旋在未来，到达每个角落，影响文明世界中的每个男人和女人。

这就是信用的范围；但要注意的是，在所有这些数不胜数、五花八门的形式中，在所有巨大的 "我的 "和 "你的 "之间的交流中，最终的参考是唯一的价值标准，也就是贵金属的价值。文明世界已经采用这些作为其大量义务的普遍溶剂。人们认为，某种标准是必不可少的；人们断言，如果政府不会使其征收的税款变得任意、不平等和压迫性，--如果它们会使个人的交易变得相互和公正，--如果它们会保护其臣民的财产和劳动免受强权的无情摆布，并使社会不至于恢复到或多或少的野蛮状态，那么提供一种固定和公平的货币计量标准就是政府义不容辞的责任；大多数政府都选择金和银作为最佳标准。由于在数量和价值上似乎比其他任何东西都更少变化，不腐朽，可携带，可分割，既方便又安全，贵金属挑战了比其他任何产品更高的地位；因此，每份合同和每笔债务都可转化为金银。从这一事实中，读者将立即看到这些材料在贸易经济中的巨大意义，以及它们不仅应在价值上统一，而且应平均分配，以便在需要时可以轻易获得。它们价值的每一次变化，都是用它们来衡量和清偿的大量债务的价值的实际变化；而每一次对它们的稀缺或消失的担忧，不管是由什么原因引起的，都是对所有有债务需要支付或接受的人的窘迫的担忧。

但是，这个标准恰恰不是一个准确的标准。它不是站在那里，而只有其他东西在动，而是自己在动；它的价值是可变的，根据供求关系不时地波动，并根据世界贸易的扰动从一个地方到另一个地方。此外，其功能的突出性--其价值的普遍性和持久性--使其对偶然的影响，或对贸易通常运作之外的影响特别敏感。任何地方发生的重大战争或革命，暴风雨或霜冻造成的小麦或棉花等重要主食的损失，以及一些重大投机性刺激导致的下跌和反应，都有可能造成这种宝贵材料的巨大流失或封存。当1848年意大利爆发叛乱时，每一粒硬币都像被扔进亚得里亚海或维苏威火山口一样有效地消失了；当1846年英国玉米歉收时，英格兰银行在不到9天内损失了1000万美元的黄金，全国在大约一个月内损失了5倍的黄金；在我们自己最近的经历中，在人民中间有3亿黄金，我们看到它被如此放走，没有任何魅力或诱饵能把它从其藏身处吸引过来。

那么，除了这些简单的事实之外，我们还需要走得更远吗？"这就是支撑所有金融困境和恐慌的基本事实。商业中的大量交易依赖于信贷；这种信贷的溶剂是黄金；而黄金不仅有一个滑动的价值尺度，而且在最需要的时候很容易消失。当商业活动以正常的方式进行时，它对任何目的都是绰绰有余的；但一旦出现任何事件，如市场迅速下跌，引起匆忙的销售，或货币流失，扰乱了普遍的信心，每个人都会感到忧虑，每个人都要求每个人付款，每个人都把每个人拒之门外，--直到一种 sauve qui peut 的感觉变得普遍。


如果除了金属货币之外，任何地方都没有货币，那么，只要信贷和信贷的纸质票据继续作为交换的媒介，这种对突发事件的责任仍然会笼罩着贸易；对这一真理的本能或实验性认识，再加上其他动机，就是导致人们为提供金银的货币替代品而做出各种尝试的原因。在斯巴达，Lycurgus发现，正如他所想的那样，它是一种冲压皮革；但现代的智慧更倾向于纸张。我们不知道Lycurgus取得了多大的成功；但我们知道现代人的成功，因为他们经历了大约150年的反复灾难。有一些马是不能骑的；它们是如此脆弱和顽固，以至于你把谁放在它们的背上，它都会被抛出去，你可以发明任何的套圈或破损的东西，它们都不会被固定在一个平衡或适度的步伐上。从过去的尝试来看，纸币就属于这种类型。旧世界最娴熟的驯马师和新世界最狡猾的骑师的所有聪明才智和努力都白费了，无法为这匹急躁的马设计出有效的纪律和约束。纸币要么拒绝被骑，横冲直撞，要么，如果有人成功地骑上它一段时间，它就会进行一次旅行，就像唐吉诃德骑在著名的卡瓦里诺或翼马背上那样。在想象中，他升到了被施了魔法的地方，但实际上，他只是被拖着穿过交替出现的火焰和寒风，最后发现这匹马自己只是一个小兵和饼干的存放处。


在大多数情况下，纸币都是在两种情况中的一种下发行的，即：当它被认为是不可赎回的时候，它是建立在一些政府在某个时间或其他时间以财产形式支付它的模糊义务之上的；或者是在要求下可转换为金银的。但在这两种情况下，似乎都不可能使它免于过剩和随之而来的贬值。从表面上看，没有什么比由政府的所有责任和财产支持的货币义务更安全、更可靠的了；但我们不记得有哪一次发行不可赎回的政府货币时，它没有迟早使政府失去赎回的希望。任何政治家的美德都无法抵御随意创造货币的诱惑。即使在政府银行的票据有名义上的可兑换性的情况下，它们在实践中也很难发挥作用。例如，1637年，瑞典君主建立了斯德哥尔摩银行；但在不久之后，它的发行量就达到了四千八百万卢布，其贬值率为96%。1736年，丹麦成立了哥本哈根银行；但在成立后的9年内，它完全停止了赎回，其票据也贬值了46%。我们不需要提及法国的转让债券或美国大陆货币的特别发行，也不需要提及落在俄罗斯和奥地利的大量纸张。在所有这些试验中，根据不同的历史学家的说法，人民的痛苦是绝对令人震惊的。然而，在这些纸币实验中，有一项是在最有希望的情况下开始的，而且是在声称可兑换的基础上进行的，但它的影响是如此巨大和可怕，以至于它在历史上占据了法罗斯的位置，而且永远不会被遗忘。当然，我们指的是法国摄政时期的银行业挥霍行为，这些行为与被称为劳氏密西西比泡沫的计划有关，尽管银行和泡沫在本质上没有联系。我们假定我们的读者对这些事件很熟悉，因为所有的现代历史学家都描述过这些事件，而且更有哲理的人认为这些事件是道德败坏和缺乏政治原则的根源，从而加速了伟大革命的到来。路易十四在他身后留下了约一亿美元的债务，作为他的荣耀的代价，法国政府为了减少债务，下令重新铸造路易币。颁布了一项法令，要求以16利弗尔的价格发行硬币，并以20利弗尔的价格再次发行；但罗，一个敏锐而富有进取心的苏格兰人，建议通过他口袋里的一个银行项目来更愉快地实现这一目的。他建议以高于铸币厂允许的价格购买旧币，并以银行票据支付。这个计划非常成功，摄政王把它掌握在自己手中，然后开始发行钞票，这简直让整个法国都陶醉了。炒股、赌博、疯狂的投机、不计后果的兴奋和放荡的场面从未超过每天在Quincampoix街上演的场面；当泡沫破裂时，痛苦是普遍的、令人心碎的和可怕的。一本当代回忆录说，许多人口袋里装着几百万，却不知道到哪里去吃晚饭；抱怨和咒骂声响彻云霄；一些人彻底破产，在绝望中自杀；关于民众起义的神秘传言在整个巴黎传播着另一种预期的圣巴托洛缪的恐怖。

在这种情况下，这些现象更加引人注目，因为它们是在很短的时间内发生的，而且发生在一个因其印象的多变性和奢侈性而广为人知的民族中。法国人是一个容易激动的民族，无论他们做什么或遭受什么，都会把戏剧效果发挥到极致；由于这个原因，人们可能会认为，我们所提到的巨大的骚动部分是由于民族气质造成的。但是，由于类似的原因，在迟钝和冷静的英国人中也产生了类似的效果，他们的商业动乱与法国人一样多，一样具有灾难性，只是它们分布在更广泛的时间内，并受民族更迟钝和保守的习惯所控制。在罗与法国摄政王接触的大约20年前，另一个苏格兰人威廉-帕特森得到了麦考利的英雄威廉和他的大臣们的支持，并为伟大的英格兰银行奠定了基础。它于1694年根据向政府提供的预付款而获得特许；在它的支持下，逐渐形成了庞大的英国银行体系，为世界银行体系提供了基调。让我们看看结果如何；它们可以用几个词来表达：每隔10年或15年，就会发生一次可怕的商业颠覆，中间是投机、恐慌和破产的时代。

我们不能在这里讨论这家银行的历史，也不能讨论其倒闭的各种原因；但我们从一个简短的年代表中，用它自己的话来选择一些主要事件，这也是英国贸易和金融的事件。

1694. 该银行开始运作。

1696. 银行暂停支付纸币。恐慌和失败。

1707. 伪装者威胁要入侵。银行被挤兑，出现了恐慌。政府帮助它度过难关，以6%的利率担保其票据。

1714. 伪装者在苏格兰宣告成立。挤兑银行，--恐慌。

1718-20. 南海泡沫的时间。反应，对货币的需求，英格兰银行几乎被扫地出门，贸易暂停，国家陷入痛苦。

1744. 查尔斯-爱德华启程前往苏格兰，并向德比进军。恐慌。银行受到冲击，不得不用六便士支付，并封锁银行大门，以争取时间。

1772. 大规模的破产和货币恐慌。银行维持其票据的可兑换性达数年之久，每年花费85万英镑。

1793. 与法国的战争，--黄金流失，--银行合同，--恐慌，--全国各地的失败，--普遍囤积，--一百家乡村银行停止，首次发行低至5英镑的纸币，--价格普遍下跌。


1796. 一项枢密院命令暂停了银行的实物支付。

1799. 大量的失败，--主要是在欧洲大陆。英国的压力通过发行国库券得到了缓解。

1807-9. 亚麻、大麻、丝绸、羊毛等的大量投机活动。

1810. 投机的回潮，--广泛的失败，以及对货币的巨大需求。

1811. 议会通过了一项决议，宣布一磅纸币和一先令为一基尼的法定货币。

1814-16. 沉重的损失和破产，--240家乡村银行倒闭，--人民的窘迫和痛苦堪比法国密西西比河计划破裂后的情况。

1819. 在暂停了27年之后，于1823年通过了恢复货币支付的法律。

1822. 整个欧洲的商业大萧条，农业窘迫，爱尔兰发生饥荒。

1824. 外国贷款和新公司的证券和股票的投机活动，数额巨大。

1825. 投机的回潮，银行的挤兑，70家银行停业，黄金的流失耗尽了银行的金银。

1826. 贸易萧条，--政府向银行预付了国库券。

1832. 挤兑黄金，银行里的金条再次惊人地减少。

1834-7. 美国的杰克逊诉比德尔案在英国产生了相当大的混乱，--黄金流失，--巨大的收缩和扩张交替进行，--严重的商业困境。

1844. 银行宪章的更新，限制了它的发行，--铁路股票的大量投机，金额达500,000,000英镑。

1845. 投机的回潮，--财产的巨大牺牲。

1846. 黄金枯竭，大量进口玉米，恐慌。


1847. 黄金继续流失，恐慌和普遍的商业萧条，银行拒绝提供折扣，强迫出售各种财产，银行章程被暂停。

1857. 1847年的经历在更大的范围内重演，银行特许法案再次被暂停。

现在，这一记录并没有显示出银行业的辉煌成就；它并没有鼓励那些对国家机构寄予厚望的人的希望；因为英格兰银行是全球第一个商业国家的金融智慧和政治智慧的最高成果。作为政府公认的盟友，--处于世界贸易的中心，--在其范围内享有很大的行动自由，--由大都会最杰出的商人管理，得到最有成就的政治经济学家的帮助，--不时得到从沃尔波尔到皮尔的最伟大的大臣的认可和修正，--由于它的地位、权力和它所掌握的人才，它有一切机会做一个银行可以做的最好的事情；然而，看看这个周期性无能的记录吧！它的周期性恶作剧，我们可以看到。它的周期性弊端我们就不说了。

在美国，我们也遭受了类似的金融癫痫症的反复发作；我们尝试了所有的权宜之计，但每一项都失败了；我们有三家国家银行；我们有数千家特许银行，有无数的法规和限制，以防止过度和欺诈；作为适当的评论，我们有三次巨大的灾难，整个大陆被淹没在商业废墟中，此外还有十几个较小的考验沧桑的时代。我们的贸易史一直是一轮又一轮的通货膨胀和崩溃的历史；为了打破对银行的限制，与银行有关的大量无赖和欺诈行为，除了在海绵屋里，没有其他地方可以相比。一位比利时哲学家从对统计数据的研究中推断出无序中的某种秩序，或者说谋杀、自杀、犯罪和私生子重复出现的周期性规律；看来在我们周期性的汉克爆炸中也能轻易发现类似的规律性。


在其他国家的悲惨经历面前，在危险的岩石高高耸立在水面上，到处都是以前的残骸碎片的情况下，我们仍然坚持走着可悲的老路。多么屈辱的忏悔！对这个实际的民族所谓的实际辨别力的评论！对激进主义者、社会主义者和各种乌托邦式的梦想家来说，这是一个多么好的文本啊 如果这些货币失常的弊端仅限于财富的损失，2 这就是传说中的插翅难飞，我们可能会把它们看作是天意的告诫，不要过分相信财富；但它们应该被看作是比单纯的财富逆转更糟糕的东西：它们产生的混乱动摇了道德的根基；在粉碎工业的同时，它们破坏了经济和节俭，撕裂了人类的诚信。我们怀疑，在我们不完善的文明中，是否有任何一种伟大的邪恶形式--奴隶贸易、放荡、贫穷--比这些在财产价值和使用权方面的不断革命更能引起个人的痛苦或对公众的损害。这些只影响到有限的阶级，但这些是每一个阶级；它们放松和扭曲了整个社会的道德制度。如果像人们有时所说的那样，当今时代比以往任何时代都更深地沉浸在物质主义中，--如果它的企业不仅更加大胆，而且更加鲁莽和挥霍，--如果良心的约束在实际事务中失去了力量，宗教和荣誉的指令同样失去了神圣性，那是因为不确定的原则、赌博精神、狂热的渴望和疯狂的奢侈，这些都困扰着交通方式。生活在这样一个世界里，金色的、虚幻的梦境很快就被可怕的噩梦和痛苦的夜晚所取代，社会失去了对生活现实的把握，并盲目地走向致命的堕落和解体。


那么，问题是，是否应该允许这种悲惨的事情继续下去，或者我们是否应该努力做得更好。我们的良知，我们的道德感，我们的进步本能，与我们的利益合谋，宣称我们应该做得更好；但我们应该如何做得更好？"为什么，"伟大的民主党医生--总统布坎南先生和人民的内斯特先生--回答说，"禁止发行小额银行票据！" 好吧，这种说法不值得鄙视；这种措施会有一些好处；在某种程度上，它可以对银行的发行进行制约；它可以通过将纸币流通限制在较大的交易商手中来扩大货币基础，从而使较贫穷和劳动阶层免受银行破产和停业的影响。但是，如果这些先生们认为挤出小额纸币会在任何程度上补救过度交易，或在任何程度上缓和每个人都抱怨的灾难性波动，他们只是以最肤浅的方式阅读了商业史。投机、过度交易、恐慌、货币抽搐，在不允许使用小纸币的国家发生，就像在允许使用小纸币的国家发生一样；它们在这两个国家都发生，而我们却无法将它们总是追溯到货币的状况。事实上，几乎所有的贸易大灾难都发生在没有小钞的时代和地方。每个人都听说过荷兰的郁金香狂热--当时荷兰人、贵族、农民、机械师、水手、女仆，甚至是扫烟囱的人和穿旧衣服的妇女，都涉足球茎，--当时巨大的财富被押在一种根的生长上，整个国家都为之疯狂，尽管当时还没有银行或纸币的存在。每个人都听说过1719年英国的南海泡沫，当时一家仅被特许在南海进行贸易的公司的股票在几周内涨到了百分之八百九十的非凡高度，并使整个英国充满了流行的赌博狂潮，以至于成千上万的人被反冲毁掉，他们还拖累了大量的公司和机构。然而，在当时的英国，没有一张纸币的价格低于20英镑，或近百美元。


更近一些的反动事件则更能说明问题。1825年，英国出现了对股份制企业和外国贷款的巨大投机。约有五百三十二家新公司成立，名义资本约为二十二亿美元，希腊、奥地利和南美的贷款谈判达到了二亿七千五百万美元。这些公司或这些贷款中几乎没有一家支付过股息；其结果是信贷和财产的普遍破坏，以及与密西西比河和南海泡沫造成的可怕痛苦相比的痛苦程度。然而，在英国流通的纸币中，没有低于五英镑或二十五美元的。同样，我们的读者可能还记得1845年至1866年期间铁路股票的畸形过度交易。涉及500,000,000英镑投资的项目在很短的时间内就开始了；购买的传染病蔓延到了所有的省会城市；传统上稳重和清醒的英国人对它们像三月的野兔一样疯狂；默多克先生胜利了；最后，国家不得不用另一个恐慌、苦难和毁灭的季节来为其谵妄付出代价。然而，在所有这些激动人心的事件中，不仅没有小纸币在流通，而且，最值得注意的是，银行的发行量没有任何不寻常的增加。

因此，如果该计划得以实施，我们不要对抑制小纸币寄予太多希望；我们不要自欺欺人地期望它在任何意义上都能成为治疗货币周期性疾病的满意药方；因为它的好处虽然可能，但必须是有限的。


在上面的评论中，我们试图指出（因为我们的局限性不允许我们进行阐述）两件事。第一，在现代普遍使用信贷作为交换媒介的情况下--这种信贷指的是一种本身就在波动的标准--有可能出现某些关键性的失调，这时机器会失灵，如果我们可以这样说的话，或者信贷会在对现金的徒劳的渴望中消失；第二，在人们为防止这种责任的后果而设计的纸币替代品中，他们极大地加剧了，而不是抵消或减轻了这种危险。但是，如果这些观点是正确的，社会要决定的问题也有两个，即：是否有可能摆脱这些恶化；以及信贷本身是否可以这样组织，以便自给自足，无论标准如何变化无常。抑制小纸币可能对减少纸币的弊端有明显的效果，但它不会触及更根本的问题，即信贷的稳定组织。然而，我们相信，所有改革的努力都必须朝这个方向发展。信用是贸易的新原则，是现代社会的纽带；但它几乎没有被适当考虑。虽然它被可耻地利用，正如法国人所说，但它从未被科学地构成过。

在旧方法的影响下，也不会如此，--除非立法者和政治家放弃篡改货币的业务，--除非他们放弃 "对冲杜鹃 "的妄想，用洛克的说法，--允许自由的原则来调整这个问题，就像它已经调整了同样重要的问题。让政府坚持他们的任务，提供一个纯粹的贵金属标准，并在履行他们应得的东西时要求它，如果他们愿意的话；但让他们在公正和平等的法律的监护下，把使用和管理自己的信用符号的任务留给商业的良好意识、明智和自我利益。我们过去在提供人工货币方面的试验是公然的、不可否认的失败；但是，正如我们认为的那样，仍然有可能从这些试验中推断出这一原则的充分证明，即流通的安全性、经济性和规律性仅仅在整个货币业务向无障碍贸易的健康影响开放的程度上有所改善，因此我们推断，更大的自由将确保该系统的一些行动更加完整。货币被正确地命名为流通，就像人体中血液的巨大运动一样，依赖于空气的自由吸入。


在更大的自由下，我们应该期望信贷在相互责任和保证的基础上组织起来，这将为贸易的巨大收缩和收缩运动提供稳定而美好的支持；它将把所有纸币的排放减少到它们的合法性质，仅仅是商业信物，并把人类从虚假货币的可怕的放荡行为中解放出来。迄今为止，商业一直被迫坐在世界市场上，就像坐在赌桌上的歌妓一样，眼睛发热，胸口发闷，脸颊发红，但它将得到再生和改善，直到它成为它本来的样子，成为一个有益的女神，从她的丰收之角向所有国家倾吐大地的感激。

我们猜想，无论纸币的流通状况如何，一半的棉花或小麦作物歉收，都会在 "价格 "中占相当大的比重。
然而，这一点是不能轻易估计的。西曼在他的《国家的进步》中说，在过去的一个半世纪里，纸币造成的直接损失相当于20亿美金。
非常奇怪的是，当我们的领导人赞成驱除小纸币时，许多法国和英国的自由主义者却在呼吁发行小纸币！这让我们感到非常惊讶。