2022.03.14 美国的犹豫不决令人心碎

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America’s Hesitation Is Heartbreaking
As the leader of NATO and of the free world, the United States needs to think much bigger than it has thus far.

By Eliot A. Cohen
A man crouches next to unexploded ordnance in Ukraine.
Reuters
MARCH 14, 2022
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About the author: Eliot A. Cohen is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and the Arleigh Burke chair in strategy at CSIS. From 2007 to 2009, he was the Counselor of the Department of State. He is the author most recently of The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.

“When you’re at war, you’re at war,” the saying goes, and if so, you have to accept the implications. So too in the present circumstance. The United States and its NATO allies are engaged in a proxy war with Russia. They are supplying thousands of munitions and hopefully doing much else—sharing intelligence, for example—with the intent of killing Russian soldiers. And because fighting is, as the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz said, “a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter,” we must face a fact: To break the will of Russia and free Ukraine from conquest and subjugation, many Russian soldiers have to flee, surrender, or die, and the more and faster the better.

Thus far the Biden administration has done an admirable job of winning the information war, mobilizing the NATO alliance, and imposing crippling (if not yet complete) sanctions on the Russian economy. It has, it appears, sped the delivery of some weapon systems (notably Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missiles) to Ukrainian forces. But beyond those measures to prosecute this proxy war as a war, it is stumbling.

The recent dustup about a Polish proposal to hand MiG-29 fighter planes to the United States to then pass to Ukrainian forces, the deficit being made good by spare U.S. F-16 fighters to Poland, is a prime example of this. On March 6, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Face the Nation:

That gets a green light. In fact, we’re talking with our Polish friends right now about what we might be able to do to backfill their needs if in fact they choose to provide these fighter jets to the Ukrainians. What could we do? How can we help to make sure that they get something to backfill the planes that they're handing over to the Ukrainians? We’re in very active discussions with them about that.

Two days later, the Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby said, “We will continue to consult with Poland and our other NATO allies about this issue and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland’s proposal is a tenable one … It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it.”

What followed were a set of petulant comments and leaks about how the United States had been blindsided by the Poles, that the planes would not do the Ukrainians much good, and that the proposed exchange would pose unacceptable escalatory risks.

Each of these criticisms was misplaced, and that is putting it kindly. More of the problem lies on the American rather than on the Polish side, it would appear, where the Department of State and the Department of Defense were not coordinated—the job of the National Security Council staff. For close observers of last summer’s Afghanistan fiasco, this foul-up was disturbingly familiar. When you are at war, you need to be disciplined in your decision making, and once again, the United States was not.

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Whether the MiG-29s could be successfully operated by the Ukrainians (who have their own MiG-29s) with just a few weeks of familiarization is an unclear technical point. The Poles have just under 100 fighter aircraft, of which 28 are MiG-29s. They also have 48 F-16s. The swap, from that point of view, was not only doable but sensible: The Poles would be strengthened by the F-16s. But even if the Ukrainians would struggle to use the MiG-29s effectively, the point is that Ukraine is a friendly nation fighting for its life, and sometimes, in coalition war, you do things that make a statement and build morale even if they are not militarily optimal. The Allies sent convoys of equipment to the Soviet Union at horrendous cost during World War II, in order to keep Stalin in the war, for exactly this reason. And in the same vein, the snide remarks about uncontrollable Poles come from American officials whose border is not a front line with a war zone, and who have not been willing to take in refugees by the hundreds of thousands, let alone by the million. A wartime coalition leader has to act like one, reassuring besieged and risk-taking allies even if they are not always technically correct. Instead, American officials whinged.

But perhaps the most pernicious note here was the hand-wringing over escalation. On the face of it, that is an absurd notion. Javelins kill Russian soldiers. Stingers kill Russian pilots and soldiers. A MiG-29 is just one more weapon that would kill Russian pilots and soldiers. And having already hinted that the United States would supply more sophisticated surface-to-air weapons to Ukraine, the notion that transferring fighter planes would escalate the conflict is simply preposterous.


The American fear of escalation has been a repeated note throughout this conflict. But to the extent American leaders express that sentiment, or spread such notions to receptive reporters, they make matters worse, giving the Russians a psychological edge. The Russians can (and do) threaten to ratchet things up, knowing that the West will respond with increased anxiety rather than reciprocal menace. We have yet to see, for example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin telling the world what a wretched hand the Russians are playing militarily, and how superior ours is—a message he is particularly fit to deliver.

As for the nuclear question: We should not signal to the Russians that they have a trump card they can always play to stop us from doing pretty much anything. Nuclear weapons are why the United States should refrain from attacking Russia directly, not why it should fear fighting Russians in a country they invaded. Only a few years ago, the United States Air Force killed Russian Wagner mercenaries by the hundreds in Syria; American and Russian pilots tangled in the skies over Korea and possibly Vietnam. Nuclear deterrence cuts both ways, and the Russian leadership knows it. Vladimir Putin and those around him are ill-informed but not mad, and the use of nuclear weapons would threaten their very survival.

When the Ukrainians are willing to spill their blood, seemingly without limit, in a wholly admirable cause, American hesitation is heartbreaking. New Hampshire license plates bear the state motto live free or die, attributed to the Revolutionary War General John Stark. The Ukrainians are acting on that belief, which previous generations of Americans acted upon as well.


And it is all completely unnecessary. In many ways, American decision makers are still acting on the basis of widespread prewar analysis of the Russian military that has proved utterly unjustified by events. The Russians do not have what is technically termed escalation dominance. NATO (and above all, American) air power could sweep the skies over Ukraine clear of Russian aircraft, and after a week or two of smashing Russian air defenses, devastate its ground forces. The Russian army is not advancing implacably; it is plagued by incompetence, poor supplies, corruption, terrible morale, bad tactics, and a cause in which its soldiers do not believe. Russian reserves are not like the Israeli reserves, the Finnish reserves, or for that matter the American National Guard: They are badly equipped and do not train. The truth is, with enough arms, the Ukrainians can break the invaders, and in some areas they have begun to do so.

It is not just the fact and the atmospherics of arms supply to Ukraine that matter now, but scale and urgency. The United States has said that it has begun shipping $200 million in aid. That sounds well enough, but when Javelin missiles cost in the low six figures each, that is less than it sounds—and at least an order of magnitude less than is necessary. As the leader of NATO and of the free world, the United States needs to think much bigger than it has thus far. The stream of arms going into Ukraine needs to be a flood.


This is a war of desperate importance not just to Europe but to international order and freedom everywhere. American officials need to rise to the moment. They cannot snipe on or off the record at allies, they cannot dodge the extent of what needs doing, and they most definitely cannot talk as though they are afraid of what Putin may do. That is the most ruinous error of all. They need to say, and say repeatedly, that a Russian war with NATO would only consummate the destruction that the Russian military is suffering at this very moment.

In the movie The Untouchables, the cop Jim Malone tells Eliot Ness what bringing down the gangster Al Capone is going to require: “You wanna know how to get Capone? Here’s how you get him. He pulls a knife; you pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital; you send one of his to the morgue … Now, do you want to do that? Are you ready to do that?”

Putin and his subordinates are, in fact, less politicians than gangsters, and need to be treated as such. Instead of talk of off-ramps, for example, there should be promises of war-crimes trials (names included) for those who kidnap mayors, shoot at fleeing civilians, and target maternity hospitals; instead of worry about escalation, there should be promises of the eradication of the Russian army in Ukraine should it use chemical weapons. Instead of carefully titrated military aid, there should be a massive effort to arm people who know why they are fighting and are good at it.


This is all bloody and brutal stuff. But, to quote Clausewitz again, “If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand.” We are dealing with an enemy that is vicious but weak, menacing but deeply fearful, and that is likely to crack long before our side does—if only we have the stomach for doing what needs to be done.

Eliot A. Cohen is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and the Arleigh Burke chair in strategy at CSIS. From 2007 to 2009, he was the Counselor of the Department of State. He is the author most recently of The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.




美国的犹豫不决令人心碎
作为北约和自由世界的领导者，美国需要比它迄今所做的想得更多。

作者：艾略特-A-科恩
在乌克兰，一名男子蹲在未爆弹药旁边。
路透社
2022年3月14日
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关于作者。艾略特-科恩（Eliot A. Cohen）是《大西洋月刊》的特约撰稿人，约翰-霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的教授，以及CSIS的阿利-伯克战略主席。2007年至2009年，他曾担任美国国务院参赞。他最近的著作是《大棒》。软实力的局限性和军事力量的必要性》。

俗话说："当你处于战争状态时，你就处于战争状态。"如果是这样，你就必须接受这种影响。在目前的情况下也是如此。美国及其北约盟友正在与俄罗斯进行一场代理战争。他们正在提供数以千计的弹药，并希望做许多其他事情，例如分享情报，目的是为了杀死俄罗斯士兵。而且，正如军事理论家卡尔-冯-克劳塞维茨所说，战斗是 "通过后者的媒介对道德和身体力量的考验"，我们必须面对一个事实：为了打破俄罗斯的意志，使乌克兰摆脱征服和被征服，许多俄罗斯士兵必须逃跑、投降或死亡，而且越多、越快越好。

到目前为止，拜登政府在赢得信息战、动员北约联盟、对俄罗斯经济实施削弱性（如果尚未完成）制裁方面做了令人钦佩的工作。它似乎已经加快了向乌克兰部队交付一些武器系统（特别是标枪反坦克导弹和毒刺便携式地对空导弹）。但除了这些将这场代理战争作为战争来进行的措施之外，它还在步履维艰。

最近关于波兰提议将米格-29战斗机交给美国，然后再转交给乌克兰军队，由美国向波兰提供备用的F-16战斗机来弥补这一赤字的风波，就是一个最好的例子。3月6日，美国国务卿安东尼-布林肯告诉《面向全国》。

这得到了一个绿灯。事实上，我们现在正在与我们的波兰朋友讨论，如果他们真的选择向乌克兰人提供这些战斗机，我们可以做些什么来填补他们的需求。我们能做什么？我们如何能帮助确保他们得到一些东西来填补他们移交给乌克兰人的飞机？我们正在与他们非常积极地讨论这个问题。

两天后，五角大楼发言人约翰-柯比说："我们将继续与波兰和我们的其他北约盟国就这个问题和它所带来的困难的后勤挑战进行磋商，但我们认为波兰的建议是站不住脚的......我们根本不清楚它有什么实质性的理由。"

随之而来的是一系列娇嗔的评论和泄密，说美国如何被波兰人忽悠了，这些飞机对乌克兰人没有什么好处，而且提议的交换会带来不可接受的升级风险。

这些批评都是错误的，这是很客气的说法。更多的问题在于美国方面而不是波兰方面，看来国务院和国防部没有协调好--这是国家安全委员会工作人员的工作。对于去年夏天的阿富汗惨败的密切观察者来说，这种失误是令人不安的。当你处于战争状态时，你需要在决策中遵守纪律，而美国又一次没有做到。

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乌克兰人（他们有自己的米格-29战机）只需熟悉几周就能成功操作米格-29战机，这是一个不明确的技术要点。波兰人只有不到100架战斗机，其中28架是米格-29战斗机。他们也有48架F-16战斗机。从这个角度来看，这次交换不仅是可行的，而且是明智的。波兰人将通过F-16战斗机得到加强。但是，即使乌克兰人将努力有效地使用米格-29战斗机，关键是乌克兰是一个为其生命而战的友好国家，有时，在联军战争中，你会做一些能表明立场和鼓舞士气的事情，即使它们在军事上不是最佳选择。二战期间，盟国以可怕的代价向苏联派出装备车队，以使斯大林留在战争中，正是出于这个原因。同样，关于无法控制的波兰人的冷嘲热讽来自美国官员，他们的边境不是战区的前线，他们不愿意接纳数十万的难民，更不用说一百万了。一个战时的联盟领导人必须表现得像一个人，向被围困的、承担风险的盟友保证，即使他们在技术上并不总是正确的。相反，美国官员却在发牢骚。

但是，这里最有害的注意也许是对升级的手忙脚乱。从表面上看，这是一个荒谬的概念。标枪杀死了俄罗斯士兵。刺刀杀死了俄罗斯飞行员和士兵。米格-29只是又一种会杀死俄罗斯飞行员和士兵的武器。在已经暗示美国将向乌克兰提供更先进的地对空武器的情况下，转让战斗机会使冲突升级的说法简直是荒谬的。


在这场冲突中，美国人对冲突升级的恐惧一直是一个重复的注意。但是，如果美国领导人表达了这种情绪，或者向接受采访的记者传播这种观念，他们就会使事情变得更糟，给俄罗斯人以心理上的优势。俄国人可以（也确实）威胁要把事情搞大，因为他们知道西方会以更大的焦虑而不是对等的威胁来回应。例如，我们还没有看到国防部长劳埃德-奥斯汀告诉世界，俄国人在军事上玩得多么糟糕，而我们的军事是多么优越--他特别适合传递这样的信息。

至于核问题。我们不应该向俄罗斯人发出信号，让他们知道他们有一张王牌可以随时用来阻止我们做几乎任何事情。核武器是美国应该避免直接攻击俄罗斯的原因，而不是美国应该害怕在俄罗斯人入侵的国家与他们作战的原因。仅仅几年前，美国空军在叙利亚杀死了数百名俄罗斯瓦格纳雇佣兵；美国和俄罗斯飞行员在朝鲜和可能是越南的天空中纠缠。核威慑是双向的，俄罗斯领导人也知道这一点。弗拉基米尔-普京和他身边的人虽然消息不灵通，但并不疯狂，使用核武器会威胁到他们的生存。

当乌克兰人愿意为了一个完全令人钦佩的事业而无限制地抛头颅洒热血时，美国人的犹豫令人心碎。新罕布什尔州的车牌上印有该州的座右铭 "不自由，毋宁死"，这是革命战争时期的约翰-斯塔克将军所写的。乌克兰人正在根据这一信念采取行动，前几代美国人也是这样做的。


而这一切是完全没有必要的。在许多方面，美国决策者仍在根据战前对俄罗斯军队的广泛分析行事，而这些分析已被事件证明是完全不合理的。俄国人并不拥有技术上所谓的升级优势。北约（尤其是美国）的空中力量可以将乌克兰上空的俄罗斯飞机扫荡一空，在粉碎俄罗斯的防空系统一两个星期后，摧毁其地面部队。俄罗斯军队并不是无情地推进；它被无能、供应不足、腐败、糟糕的士气、糟糕的战术以及士兵不相信的事业所困扰。俄罗斯的后备军不像以色列的后备军、芬兰的后备军，也不像美国的国民警卫队。他们的装备很差，而且没有训练。事实是，只要有足够的武器，乌克兰人就能打垮入侵者，而且在某些地区他们已经开始这样做了。

现在重要的不仅仅是向乌克兰供应武器的事实和气氛，还有规模和紧迫性。美国说，它已经开始运送2亿美元的援助。这听起来很好，但当标枪导弹每枚价格在六位数时，这比听起来要少--至少比需要的要少一个数量级。作为北约和自由世界的领导者，美国需要比它迄今所做的想得更多。进入乌克兰的武器流需要成为一股洪流。


这场战争不仅对欧洲，而且对世界各地的国际秩序和自由都具有极大的重要性。美国官员需要站出来迎接这个时刻。他们不能在记录上或记录外对盟友进行狙击，他们不能回避需要做的事情的程度，而且他们绝对不能说得好像他们害怕普京可能做什么。这是最糟糕的错误。他们需要说，并且反复说，俄罗斯与北约的战争只会完成俄罗斯军队此刻正在遭受的破坏。

在电影《不可触犯的人》中，警察吉姆-马龙告诉艾略特-尼斯，扳倒黑帮分子阿尔-卡彭需要什么。"你想知道如何抓住卡彭吗？这就是你如何抓住他。他拔出一把刀，你拔出一把枪。他把你的一个人送进医院；你把他的一个人送进太平间......现在，你想这样做吗？你准备好这样做了吗？"

事实上，普京和他的下属与其说是政治家，不如说是黑帮分子，并且需要被这样对待。例如，与其谈论 "下坡路"，不如承诺对那些绑架市长、向逃亡的平民开枪和以妇产医院为目标的人进行战争罪审判（包括姓名）；与其担心升级，不如承诺如果俄罗斯军队在乌克兰使用化学武器，将其铲除。与其说是谨慎的军事援助，不如说是大规模地武装那些知道自己为什么战斗并且擅长战斗的人。


这都是血腥和残酷的东西。但是，再次引用克劳塞维茨的话："如果一方毫无顾忌地使用武力，不为流血所吓倒，而另一方却不这样做，那么前者将占上风。" 我们面对的是一个凶狠但软弱，来势汹汹但令人深感恐惧的敌人，而且很可能在我们一方之前就已经崩溃了--只要我们有勇气去做需要做的事情。

艾略特-科恩（Eliot A. Cohen）是《大西洋月刊》的特约撰稿人，约翰-霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的教授，以及CSIS的阿利-伯克战略主席。2007年至2009年，他曾担任美国国务院参赞。他最近的著作是《大棒》。软实力的局限性和军事力量的必要性。