1966.09 中东军备竞赛

shiyi18

Middle East Arms Race
SEPTEMBER 1966 ISSUE
SHARE

A POTENTIAL Middle East balance of terror haunts the capitals of long-contending states. Security is no longer measured in numbers of divisions and exact distributions of military hardware. Possible future atomic capability, or an equivalent command of atomic guarantee, is becoming the criterion of strength and power. The most optimistic view is that the Arabs and Israelis are using atomic language in a new version of psychological warfare. Can Israel produce bombs at Dimona? Did German scientists really put Egypt on the track of the same possibility? Each side hopes that the other believes it. Each says it will not be the first to introduce such weapons into the area. Each needs to bolster prestige by keeping up the sinister guessing game.


The Middle East contenders appear today to be approaching the nuclear world with somewhat different strategies. Egypt and Israel both signed the test-ban treaty of 1963. But since that time Egypt has made no secret of its need for international reassurance. Last May’s joint appeal by Presidents Tito and Nasser for a general disarmament conference was only the last of a series of such moves. At Geneva disarmament sessions, Egyptian delegates play an active role, suggesting means of detecting underground tests and ways of control. Along with other atomic have-nots at Stockholm last spring, Egyptians explored ways of differentiating between underground explosions and earthquakes.

Magazine Cover image
View This Story as a PDF
See this story as it appeared in the pages of The Atlantic magazine.

Open
Pending general disarmament developments, Egypt has sought a guarantee of atomic protection from the U.S.S.R. Part of the psychological pressure in the area depends on the unknown response to this appeal. Soviet Premier Kosygin took the occasion of his last visit to Cairo to warn of the dangers of nuclear proliferation. He stressed the need for a treaty to prevent it “as soon as possible.”

Denuclearization of the Mediterranean is, of course, an important Soviet objective. The Russians have offered an agreement there conditioned on the removal of American bases and of the Polaris elements of the Sixth Fleet.

Given the lack of progress toward general agreement on nonproliferation, it is not surprising that such countries as Israel and Egypt (and India) should weigh the possibility of joining the atomic club. President Nasser has said that Egypt is thinking about developing nuclear weapons because Israel “is working in this field.” It is clear from the tone of his various statements to this effect that considerations of prestige weigh as heavily as does actual security. At this stage Egypt is not believed to possess the potential for making bombs. Yet it must seem to be in the race while it is seeking actual security through guarantees.

RECOMMENDED READING
Illustration of Google search with a rose.
The Open Secret of Google Search
CHARLIE WARZEL
A crowd of voters in Colombia’s 2022 presidential election.
The President Who Did Everything Right and Got No Thanks
DAVID FRUM
A woman sits in a chair with a laptop on her knees. Behind her is a collage of colorful silhouettes of friends.
The Six Forces That Fuel Friendship
JULIE BECK
Israel’s atomic reactor
Israel, on the other hand, appears to have a real choice. While urging the major powers to draw the line against “impermissible” arms in the area, and promising that Israel will not introduce atomic weapons itself, Premier Eshkol has made it plain that Israel will make its own policy. In this field Israel leads from a certain amount of strength. Its research reactor in the Negev is capable of producing plutonium for weapons. Built with French help, and reportedly with the help of other European scientists, this reactor has a capacity of 24,000 thermal watts. It is of the heavy-water-moderated type using natural uranium. Thus each time there is mention in the world press of an Israeli deal with some South American country for uranium, the question again arises whether Dimona is being diverted to military purposes.

Israel today rejects the idea of international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Until such inspection is the rule and not the exception, it sees no reason to reveal its secrets. It contends that the IAEA is staffed with many representatives of Arab countries. If Dimona came under such scrutiny, Israel would lose its freedom to decide whether or when to make bombs. Thus even the psychological deterrent of uncertainty would be lost, as well as the final choice about a real deterrent. Visits of American scientists have been permitted with a view to reassuring Washington about Israel’s intentions. This arrangement is informal and appears to have assured the visitors that Dimona is not producing weapons.

The race for tanks and planes
Meanwhile, the balance of conventional threats to peace is precarious. A higher proportion of resources is spent for military purposes in the Middle East than anywhere else in the developing world. Military equipment has become a symbol of power and influence. It is no longer enough to have steel plants, national air lines, computers, and food freezers. The latest tanks and planes are essential status symbols.

Magazine Cover image
Explore the September 1966 Issue
Check out more from this issue and find your next story to read.

View More
In the arms race, figures are obsolete on publication. An order of magnitude is indicated by estimated troop strengths ranging from Israel’s 250,000 on immediate call, Egypt’s 180,000, Iraq’s 82,000, Syria’s 61,000, Jordan’s 36,000, and Saudi Arabia’s 20,000.

Tank strength is estimated at 1200 for Egypt, from the U.S.S.R.; 600 for Israel, including British Centurions and American Pattons; 320 for Iraq, mostly from the U.S.S.R.; and 200 for Jordan, including 150 Pattons acquired in 1965-1966.

Aircraft strengths have rapidly increased in the last two years. Israel apparently leads here with about 470 planes, among them French Mirages, Mystères, and Super Mystères as well as Skvhawk bombers now promised from the United States. Egypt is estimated to have a force of about 450 planes, of which Soviet MIG-21D’s are the most important component. Iraq accounts for about 250, including MIG-17’s and -19’s; Syria about 150; and Jordan about 36 Starfighters plus a small number of British aircraft.

Missiles on each side remain a secret to non professionals. Egypt periodically announces production of long-range missiles. Soviet-made SAM-2’s, of the type used in North Vietnam, protect Cairo, Aswan, and the Suez Canal. Israel’s theoretical possession of French missiles with 500-mile-range is denied in Tel Aviv. Its possession of French Matra air-to-air missiles is public knowledge, however, as is its acquisition of U.S. Hawks.

Defense budgets last year ran at $400 million for Egypt, $271 million for Israel, $142 million for Iraq, $108 million for Saudi Arabia. With stepped-up purchases on order in 1966, all must be rising, particularly that of Saudi Arabia. Its $400 million package for arms, fighters, rockets, and a complete air defense system, to become operable in two years, will make Saudi Arabia the potential defender of the entire Arabian peninsula. This appears to be the purpose behind the AngloAmerican agreement with King Faisal this summer.

United States policy shifts
United States policy in the Middle East in the sixties has been based on two ideas. One is the encouragement of peaceful internal development. The second has been disengagement from local quarrels. Aid programs have been tailored to encourage local initiative. The Jordan Development Board, for example, began under British and American tutelage and has evolved to independent status. Between 1959 and 1964 Jordan’s income rose 65 percent. Its growth rate is 5 percent a year. The government aims to be self-sustaining in the next decade.

In Egypt the same principles have guided American policy in a much more hectic atmosphere. Since 1955, aid in the amount of $1.2 billion has gone to the revolutionary government for its internal programs. Much of this has been for food. But much has also gone into useful work in water development, education, and management training. Private American funds have gone into oil exploration, and private American foundation grants have helped establish small industries and advanced Egypt’s birth control program. The United States has maintained a diplomatic exchange and sustained the basic food program while remaining disengaged from Egyptian political gyrations.

The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have spent a billion dollars on military aid to Egypt in rubles or in exchange for cotton. Large amounts have also gone to Syria; and 85 percent of Iraq’s matériel has come from the Eastern bloc. By contrast, during the eight years prior to 1965, American military aid to Jordan amounted to only $36 million.

Two factors have combined to pressure Washington into assuming a more direct role in Middle East defense supply. One is the increasingly sophisticated character of modern arms. These new weapons, and the ancillary matériel which goes with them, involve elaborate scientific training for those using them. Thus the question arises whether it is more advantageous to supply and train some of those who turn to Washington for support rather than to let them all turn to the East.

The failure of Arab unity
The second factor which has had to be weighed is the political polarization which has taken place with the failure of attempts at Arab unity. The effort toward unity began late in 1963 under Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the architect and leader of what came to be called Arab summitry. It was he who then headed off a violent confrontation with Israel over diversion of Jordan River headwaters. Such a confrontation could not succeed, he said, until the Arabs were united. There must not be another 1948. The struggle against Israel must be postponed until a Unified Arab Command, drawing on pooled Arab funds, developed a united strategy.

To appease the activists, particularly in Syria, a Palestine Liberation Organization was set up. Palestinians eager to prepare for action were steered into a force called the Palestine Liberation Army.

Priorities set up by the Unified Command soon put heavy pressure on King Hussein. Jordan’s pivotal geographic position, and the fact that two thirds of its citizens are former Palestinians, made this inevitable. Hussein was assigned a given number of arms to be obtained for the cause. Funds would come from the United Command treasury in Cairo, to which the oil states were heavy contributors. It was suggested at command headquarters that Russian arms were available in the needed quantities, and that a unified command could best deploy unified armament.

At this point Hussein turned to Washington. The much debated shift in American arms policy followed, after a more than usually agonizing reappraisal. Allocations of arms to help Jordan modernize its forces (and maintain its independence among the Arab states) were announced in April, 1965. There was no outcry in Tel Aviv, where Hussein has long been regarded as a stabilizing if unfriendly figure in the Arab world. In Cairo, of course, the move was recognized as a check to Nasserite ambitions.

In this fashion the American government was persuaded to face the shifting realities of power and weakness in the Middle East and to devise a case-by-case approach to appeals for defense assistance.

The second case was that of Saudi Arabia. The decision by London and Washington to provide a modern defense system in the Arabian peninsula is related to Red Sea and Arabian Gulf politics. Britain’s decision this year to relinquish its position in Aden by 1968 means that another power vacuum will be created. Its location is particularly vital, for Britain cannot relinquish its dependence on Middle East oil. Sixty-four percent of Britain’s oil imports come from the Middle East. About a quarter of its seaborne trade transits the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. London must therefore be concerned about what happens at Aden.

King Faisal’s role
Chaos in Yemen, and the failure of any federated state to evolve in response to British prodding in Aden and adjacent protectorates, causes London to look hopefully toward the one stable figure in the Gulf region, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. In a more utopian era an alternative source of security might be a UN police force. A UN role in the political evolution of South Arabia is now being sought. But neither London nor Washington can contemplate without concern the prospect of a Yemeni-style struggle over a “liberated” Aden Federation.

Lacking constructive alternatives in the face of one more British evacuation from the Middle East, Western hopes therefore focus on King Faisal, a gradualist leader to whom the mini-states in the region can look for support. But since gradualism is anathema to the hotheads in South Arabia and Aden, the King is being supplied with an air and communications system adequate for an eventual regional defense.

The stakes in this region are high. Even before the Yemeni revolution in 1962 the Chinese had appeared, offering technical aid. In its turn the U.S.S.R. invested $28 million in military aid to the former Imam’s regime. The only conceivable point to both these ventures was to gain toeholds in the Red Sea region. Thus today’s contest was clearly foreseen in Peking and Moscow. Soviet air bases remain at Sanaa and Hodeida. Lately, some electronically equipped Soviet trawlers, operating from Egypt’s Red Sea coast, have appeared to be fishing in more than one sense. Across the Red Sea, Soviet arms have for some time been going to Somalia, causing great anxiety in Addis Ababa.

It seems significant, therefore, that King Faisal has been making friendly overtures to Emperor Haile Selassie, and that he has visited Khartoum as well as Washington. Nearer home he is sponsoring and paying for a “Friendship Road,” which connects the small states on the Arabian Gulf coast with each other and with Saudi Arabia. He has settled local border disputes with Kuwait and Qatar. Another recent agreement with Jordan has set the border between them so as to enable Jordan to expand its port of Aqaba.

Israel’s position
With the obvious breakup of attempts at Arab unity and the present polarization of factions, Israel should feel more secure than in the immediate past. No one today expects an Arab drive against Israel. The violent talk about Israel seems almost in inverse relationship to potential threats. Syria is most vocal — and weakest internally. Half of Egypt’s army is still bogged down in Yemen. King Hussein is fully occupied keeping a step ahead of subversive local Nasserites, and parrying efforts by Shukairy to divide the Palestinians who make up the backbone of Jordan’s electorate. The river question is a chronic issue, but Israel does not object to the dam being constructed by Jordan on the Yarmuk.

Even so, Israel has continued insistently to argue for American defense commitments. Earlier, the plea was for a unilateral guarantee of Israel’s frontiers. When the United States determined that such a move would not be in Israel’s interest, or in its own, the argument moved to different ground. Israel wanted its independent means of defense. It wanted not to rely indefinitely on the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Israelis believe that an important turning point in relations with Washington has been reached with the agreement for eventual delivery of A-4 Skyhawk bombers. Skyhawks can operate from short runways, such as those in Israel. They have a combat range of 1000 miles and can carry 5000 pounds of bombs or missiles. The significance of this deal is that for the first time Washington has been persuaded of Israel’s need of an offensive American plane.

There are in this case, as in those with Arab countries, restrictions on procurement from other sources and on total amounts spent on arms. Yet press reports from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem reveal that Israel regards the Skyhawk agreement as a great diplomatic victory. To Tel Aviv it means that Washington accepts the idea of independent deterrent power. It is also suggested in this period of euphoria that with this deterrent promised, the decision about atomic weapons development in Israel can be postponed.


Israel may have reaped another temporary bonus in defense this last summer. U.S. pilots in July in Vietnam demonstrated a way to evade the Soviet SAM missiles in North Vietnam. The possibility that the SAM’s may therefore become obsolete is a potential blow to Cairo. The search for a new means of protection could only lead to further escalation in the region.

The lesson here is that any socalled balance of forces is transitory. And the preservation of the long Middle East truce remains as difficult as ever.





中东军备竞赛
1966年9月号


潜在的中东恐怖平衡困扰着长期竞争的国家的首都。安全不再以师团的数量和军事硬件的确切分布来衡量。未来可能的原子能力，或对原子保证的同等掌握，正在成为实力和权力的标准。最乐观的观点是，阿拉伯人和以色列人正在使用原子语言进行新版本的心理战。以色列能在迪莫纳生产炸弹吗？德国科学家真的让埃及走上了同样的可能性的轨道吗？每一方都希望另一方相信它。每一方都说它不会是第一个在该地区引进这种武器的国家。每一方都需要通过继续进行险恶的猜测游戏来提高威信。


今天，中东的竞争者们似乎正以某种不同的策略来对待核世界。埃及和以色列都签署了1963年的禁试条约。但从那时起，埃及就毫不掩饰其对国际保证的需求。去年5月，铁托总统和纳赛尔总统联合呼吁召开全面裁军会议，这只是一系列此类行动中的最后一次。在日内瓦裁军会议上，埃及代表发挥了积极作用，提出了探测地下试验的方法和控制方法。去年春天在斯德哥尔摩，埃及人与其他没有原子的人一起，探讨了区分地下爆炸和地震的方法。

杂志封面图片
以PDF格式查看本故事
查看本故事在《大西洋》杂志上的内容。

打开
在普遍的裁军发展之前，埃及已经向美苏两国寻求原子保护的保证。该地区的部分心理压力取决于对这一呼吁的未知反应。苏联总理柯西金利用他最后一次访问开罗的机会，警告核扩散的危险。他强调有必要 "尽快 "制定一项条约来防止它。

当然，地中海的无核化是苏联的一个重要目标。俄罗斯人在那里提出了一项协议，条件是撤除美国基地和第六舰队中的北极星部队。

鉴于在不扩散的普遍协议方面缺乏进展，像以色列和埃及（以及印度）这样的国家应该权衡加入原子俱乐部的可能性，这并不令人惊讶。纳赛尔总统曾说，埃及正在考虑发展核武器，因为以色列 "正在这个领域工作"。从他的各种声明的语气中可以看出，对威望的考虑和对实际安全的考虑一样重要。在这个阶段，人们认为埃及不具备制造炸弹的潜力。然而，在它通过保证寻求实际安全的同时，它必须看起来是在竞争。

推荐阅读
谷歌搜索的插图与玫瑰。
谷歌搜索的公开秘密
查利-瓦尔泽尔
哥伦比亚2022年总统选举中的一群选民。
做了所有正确的事却没有得到感谢的总统
达维德-弗鲁姆
一个女人坐在椅子上，膝盖上放着一台笔记本电脑。在她身后是一幅由朋友的彩色剪影组成的拼贴画。
促进友谊的六种力量
朱莉-贝克
以色列的原子反应堆
另一方面，以色列似乎有一个真正的选择。埃什科尔总理在敦促大国在该地区划定反对 "不允许的 "武器的界限，并承诺以色列不会自己引进原子武器的同时，已经明确表示，以色列将制定自己的政策。在这一领域，以色列以一定的实力领先。它在内盖夫的研究反应堆能够生产用于武器的钚。这个反应堆是在法国的帮助下建造的，据说还得到了其他欧洲科学家的帮助，其容量为24,000热瓦。它属于重水调节型，使用天然铀。因此，每当世界新闻界提到以色列与某个南美国家的铀交易时，就会再次出现迪莫纳是否被挪用于军事目的的问题。

今天，以色列拒绝接受国际原子能机构的国际检查的想法。在这种检查成为常规而非例外之前，它认为没有理由透露其秘密。它认为，国际原子能机构的工作人员中有许多阿拉伯国家的代表。如果迪莫纳受到这种检查，以色列将失去决定是否或何时制造炸弹的自由。因此，甚至连不确定的心理威慑也会失去，以及关于真正威慑的最终选择。美国科学家被允许进行访问，目的是让华盛顿对以色列的意图放心。这种安排是非正式的，似乎向来访者保证了迪莫纳并没有生产武器。

坦克和飞机的竞赛
与此同时，对和平的常规威胁的平衡是不稳定的。中东地区用于军事目的的资源比例高于发展中世界的其他地方。军事装备已经成为权力和影响力的象征。拥有钢铁厂、国家航空线、计算机和食品冷冻库已经不够了。最新的坦克和飞机是必不可少的地位象征。

杂志封面图片
探索1966年9月号
查看本期的更多内容，并找到你的下一个故事来阅读。

查看更多
在军备竞赛中，数字在出版时就已经过时了。一个数量级是由估计的兵力表示的，从以色列的25万立即调用，埃及的18万，伊拉克的82000，叙利亚的61000，约旦的36000和沙特阿拉伯的20000。

埃及的坦克兵力估计为1200辆，来自美苏；以色列为600辆，包括英国百夫长和美国帕顿；伊拉克为320辆，主要来自美苏；约旦为200辆，包括1965-1966年获得的150辆帕顿。

在过去的两年里，飞机的数量迅速增加。以色列显然在此领先，拥有约470架飞机，其中包括法国的幻影、神秘和超级神秘，以及美国现在承诺的Skvhawk轰炸机。埃及估计有大约450架飞机，其中苏联的MIG-21D是最重要的组成部分。伊拉克约有250架，包括MIG-17和-19；叙利亚约有150架；约旦约有36架星际战机和少量英国飞机。

双方的导弹对非专业人员来说仍然是个秘密。埃及定期宣布生产远程导弹。苏联制造的萨姆-2导弹，是在北越使用的类型，保护开罗、阿斯旺和苏伊士运河。以色列理论上拥有射程为500英里的法国导弹，但在特拉维夫被否认。然而，它拥有法国的马特拉空对空导弹是众所周知的，就像它购买美国的鹰式导弹一样。

去年埃及的国防预算为4亿美元，以色列为2.71亿美元，伊拉克为1.42亿美元，沙特阿拉伯为1.08亿美元。随着1966年订单的增加，所有的采购都必须上升，特别是沙特阿拉伯的采购。其4亿美元的武器、战斗机、火箭和完整的防空系统的一揽子计划，将在两年内投入使用，这将使沙特阿拉伯成为整个阿拉伯半岛的潜在保卫者。这似乎是今年夏天英美与费萨尔国王达成的协议背后的目的。

美国政策的转变
六十年代美国在中东的政策是基于两种想法。一个是鼓励和平的内部发展。第二是脱离当地的争吵。援助计划是为鼓励当地的主动性而制定的。例如，约旦发展委员会是在英国和美国的指导下开始的，现在已经发展到了独立地位。1959年至1964年，约旦的收入增长了65%。其增长率为每年5%。政府的目标是在未来十年内实现自给自足。

在埃及，同样的原则指导着美国的政策，但气氛却更加紧张。自1955年以来，总额为12亿美元的援助已经提供给革命政府用于其内部计划。其中大部分是用于食品。但也有很多用于水资源开发、教育和管理培训方面的有益工作。美国私人资金用于石油勘探，美国私人基金会的拨款帮助建立了小型工业，并推动了埃及的节育计划。美国在保持外交交流和维持基本食品计划的同时，也不参与埃及的政治动荡。

据估计，美苏两国以卢布或棉花交换的方式向埃及提供了10亿美元的军事援助。大量资金也流向了叙利亚；伊拉克85%的物资都来自东方集团。相比之下，在1965年之前的8年中，美国对约旦的军事援助只有3600万美元。

两个因素结合在一起，迫使华盛顿在中东的国防供应中扮演更直接的角色。一个是现代武器越来越复杂的特点。这些新武器，以及与之相配套的辅助材料，需要对使用它们的人进行精心的科学训练。因此，出现了这样一个问题：向那些向华盛顿寻求支持的人提供和培训一些武器，而不是让他们全部转向东方，是否更有利。

阿拉伯团结的失败
第二个必须权衡的因素是随着阿拉伯统一尝试的失败而发生的政治两极化。统一的努力始于1963年末，由贾迈勒-阿卜杜勒-纳赛尔领导，他是所谓的阿拉伯首脑会议的设计师和领导人。正是他当时领导了与以色列在约旦河源头改道问题上的暴力对抗。他说，这种对抗不可能成功，除非阿拉伯人团结起来。绝不能再出现1948年。对以色列的斗争必须推迟，直到一个统一的阿拉伯司令部，利用阿拉伯人的资金，制定一个统一的战略。

为了安抚活动家，特别是叙利亚的活动家，成立了一个巴勒斯坦解放组织。急于准备行动的巴勒斯坦人被引导到一支名为巴勒斯坦解放军的部队。

统一指挥部确定的优先事项很快给侯赛因国王带来了沉重的压力。约旦举足轻重的地理位置，以及其三分之二的公民是前巴勒斯坦人的事实，使得这种情况不可避免。侯赛因被分配了一定数量的武器，以便为这项事业获得武器。资金将来自开罗的联合司令部国库，而石油国家是其主要捐助方。指挥部建议，俄罗斯的武器可以达到所需的数量，而且一个统一的指挥部可以最好地部署统一的军备。

在这一点上，侯赛因求助于华盛顿。在进行了比通常更痛苦的重新评估后，美国的武器政策发生了备受争议的转变。1965年4月，美国宣布了帮助约旦实现军队现代化（并保持其在阿拉伯国家中的独立性）的武器分配方案。在特拉维夫，侯赛因长期以来一直被视为阿拉伯世界中一个稳定的人物，即使是不友好的人物，也没有引起强烈反响。当然，在开罗，此举被认为是对纳赛尔的野心的一种遏制。

通过这种方式，美国政府被说服去面对中东地区不断变化的权力和弱点的现实，并对国防援助的呼吁制定出一个逐案处理的方法。

第二个案例是沙特阿拉伯的案例。伦敦和华盛顿决定在阿拉伯半岛提供现代防御系统，这与红海和阿拉伯湾政治有关。英国今年决定在1968年之前放弃在亚丁的地位，这意味着将产生另一个权力真空。其位置尤其重要，因为英国不能放弃对中东石油的依赖。英国64%的石油进口来自中东。其海运贸易约有四分之一经过苏伊士运河和红海。因此，伦敦必须关注在亚丁发生的事情。

费萨尔国王的作用
也门的混乱，以及任何联邦国家都未能响应英国在亚丁和邻近保护地的推动而发展起来，导致伦敦对海湾地区的一个稳定人物--沙特阿拉伯的费萨尔国王抱有希望。在一个更加乌托邦的时代，另一个安全来源可能是联合国警察部队。目前正在寻求联合国在南阿拉伯的政治演变中发挥作用。但是，无论是伦敦还是华盛顿都不能不考虑对 "解放 "后的亚丁联邦进行也门式斗争的前景。

在英国再次撤离中东的情况下，由于缺乏建设性的替代方案，西方国家的希望集中在费萨尔国王身上，他是一个渐进式的领导人，该地区的小国家可以向他寻求支持。但是，由于渐进主义是南阿拉伯和亚丁的头脑发热者所不齿的，国王正被提供一个足够的空中和通信系统，以最终实现区域防御。

这个地区的风险很高。甚至在1962年也门革命之前，中国就已经出现，提供技术援助。反过来，美苏也向前伊玛目政权投资了2800万美元的军事援助。这两项投资的唯一可想而知的意义是为了在红海地区获得立足之地。因此，今天的竞争在北京和莫斯科都有明确的预见。苏联的空军基地仍然在萨那和荷台达。最近，一些配备电子装备的苏联拖网渔船，从埃及的红海海岸出发，似乎是在进行不止一种意义上的捕鱼。在红海的另一边，苏联的武器已经有一段时间被运往索马里，在亚的斯亚贝巴引起了极大的焦虑。

因此，费萨尔国王一直在向海尔-塞拉西皇帝作出友好的姿态，而且他访问了喀土穆和华盛顿，这似乎很重要。在国内，他正在赞助和支付一条 "友谊之路"，该路将阿拉伯湾沿岸的小国相互连接起来，并与沙特阿拉伯相连。他已经解决了与科威特和卡塔尔的地方边界争端。最近与约旦达成的另一项协议确定了它们之间的边界，以使约旦能够扩大其亚喀巴港。

以色列的立场
随着阿拉伯团结的尝试明显破裂，以及目前各派别的分化，以色列应该比不久前感到更安全。今天，没有人期望阿拉伯国家会对以色列发动进攻。关于以色列的暴力言论似乎与潜在威胁几乎成反比。叙利亚的呼声最高--而且内部最弱。埃及的一半军队仍在也门受困。侯赛因国王忙于应付当地纳赛尔派的颠覆活动，并抵制舒凯里分化巴勒斯坦人的努力，而这些人是约旦选民的主心骨。河流问题是一个长期的问题，但以色列并不反对约旦在亚尔穆克河上建造大坝。

即便如此，以色列仍然坚持要求美国做出防御承诺。早些时候，恳求的是对以色列边境的单方面保证。当美国确定这样做不符合以色列的利益，也不符合它自己的利益时，论点就转向了不同的地方。以色列希望有独立的防御手段。它不希望无限期地依赖第六舰队在地中海的存在。

以色列人认为，随着最终交付A-4天鹰轰炸机的协议达成，与华盛顿的关系出现了一个重要的转折点。天鹰可以在短跑道上作战，比如以色列的短跑道。它们的作战范围为1000英里，可携带5000磅的炸弹或导弹。这笔交易的意义在于，华盛顿第一次被说服了，认为以色列需要一架进攻性的美国飞机。

在这种情况下，就像与阿拉伯国家的交易一样，对从其他来源的采购和在武器上花费的总金额也有限制。然而，来自特拉维夫和耶路撒冷的新闻报道显示，以色列认为天鹰协议是一个巨大的外交胜利。对特拉维夫来说，这意味着华盛顿接受了独立威慑力量的想法。在这段欣喜的日子里，还有人表示，有了这种威慑力的承诺，以色列发展原子武器的决定就可以推迟了。


去年夏天，以色列可能在国防方面又收获了一个暂时的红利。美国飞行员7月在越南演示了一种躲避北越的苏联萨姆导弹的方法。萨姆导弹可能因此变得过时，这对开罗是一个潜在的打击。寻找新的保护手段只能导致该地区局势的进一步升级。

这里的教训是，任何所谓的力量平衡都是过渡性的。维护中东地区长期的休战状态仍然像以前一样困难。