1965.2两位战斗的将军。巴顿和麦克阿瑟

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February 1965 Issue
EXPLORE
Two Fighting Generals: Patton and Macarthur
As a prelude to becoming a superb fighting general and an ambassador to France, JAMES M. GAVINpicked coal and sold papers for a living in the Pennsylvania mining towns, enlisted in the between-wars regular Army, got into West Point without a high school education, learned to fly, and then helped to pioneer in the development of the airborne infantry. Now, at fifty-seven, he is chairman of the board of Arthur D. Little, Inc., one of the country‘s most versatile research corporations.

By James M. Gavin
FEBRUARY 1965 ISSUE
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THE sun rose slowly, as though rising from a furnace, and then quickly spread its heat across the Sicilian countryside. It was the morning of July 13, 1943, and I was en route by jeep to Gela. As I drove up on the high ground overlooking the sea, there was General George Patton, ivory-handled pistols and all, standing overlooking the busy scene in the harbor. When I arrived in front of him, still gripping an M-1 rifle, he whipped out a huge silver flask and said, “Gavin, you look like you need a drink. Have one.”

I had landed behind the enemy lines, by parachute, about seventy-five miles to the east of Gela four nights before, made my way through our lines with a handful of paratroopers the following night, picked up first a platoon of 82nd Airborne Engineers and then a battalion of parachute infantry, and engaged what later turned out to be a combat command of the Hermann Göring Panzer Division. I had had a busy two days of it, and finally made my way toward Gela on the fourth day, passing by burning tanks, quite a few dead bodies, and extensive demolished roadblocks.

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General Patton had given us a send-off talk about a week earlier, when we were still in North Africa. His talks on such occasions were usually quite good, earthy, and I was impressed. One thing that he said always stuck with me, for it was contrary to what I had believed up to that moment, but after being in combat only a short while, I knew he was right. Speaking to all of us late one afternoon as we assembled in the North African sunset, he said, “Now, I want you to remember that no son of a bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb son of a bitch die for his country.”

Patton went on to discuss the tactics that we should employ in fighting the Germans and the Italians, stressing with particular emphasis the Italians. The point that he wanted to make was that we should avoid a direct assault on an enemy position, but seek to envelop his flanks. The General in doing so, however, used terms applicable to sexual relations. He did so in a very clever manner, emphasizing the point that when one arrived in the rear of one of their positions, the Italians would invariably quickly try to switch to a new position to protect themselves, and at that moment would become vulnerable to our attack from the rear. It was not so much what he said as how he said it that caused us to remember the points that he wanted to make — though I did feel somewhat embarrassed at times, and I sensed that some of the troops felt a bit embarrassed also. Ladislas Farago in Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (Obolensky) describes the reaction of the troops to his talks: “They laughed at the elaborate pornography of his pep talks, but also blushed.” But the General made his points, and they remembered them as much for the very language that he used as for their content.

General Patton commanded the U. S. Seventh Army in its assault on the island of Sicily. It was a command to which he had aspired all his life; and his life was a tumultuous one, from the day he graduated from West Point in 1909 until he met his untimely death in Germany shortly after the end of World War II. Never a man to hold back an opinion, nor to take counsel from his fears, George Patton was a restless, impatient, peacetime soldier. He burned up much of his energy playing handball, playing polo – he was a seven-goal man – and writing. And when he wasn’t doing these things, he was sailing his yacht, or writing to the service journals about war as he foresaw it, or doing any one of the many things that he did well. There were a number of doubts when he was selected for his first armored command since he had been known as a horse cavalry enthusiast for many years. Few realized, however, that he had commanded armored tank forces with distinction in World War I.

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General George C. Marshall had served with him in World War I and appreciated not only his tank background but the effervescent driving qualities of leadership that characterized everything he undertook. Farago describes how General Marshall, in anticipation of the need for his exceptional leadership, picked him from almost certain retirement to bring him to Fort Myer, Virginia, in October of 1938, and then sent him to his first armored command at Fort Benning, Georgia. General Patton commanded the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, when I commanded the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, at the same post, but on the Alabama side of the Chattahoochee River. The common meeting grounds of the troops from both commands were the bridges over the river between Phenix City and Columbus. They were the scene of some rather serious forays, out of which came a degree of mutual respect. In our first major battle in Sicily in World War II, we found ourselves joined with the 2nd Armored, and the paratroopers still insist today that they were lining the curbs with the Sicilians, applauding the 2nd Armored as it captured Palermo.

Patton‘s sweep around the west end of the island was both heartening and reassuring to U.S. enthusiasts of armored equipment. However, as his forces advanced eastward toward Messina, they eventually began to go through a narrow funnel as the rugged terrain moved closer to the sea. It was at this time that General Ridgway and I called on Patton in his headquarters in Palermo to consider the use of parachute troops in cooperation with proposed amphibious end runs. We finally agreed that the terrain was too restricted in its possibilities for paratroopers, but nevertheless Patton launched two successful amphibious assaults. Winston Churchill, long an advocate of exploiting Allied superior sea power, was intrigued, and Farago, in referring to these amphibious coups, quotes Churchill,

“I had of course always been a partisan of the ‘endrun,’ as the Americans call it,” he wrote, “or ‘cat-claw,’ which was my term. I had never succeeded in getting this maneuver open to sea power included in any of our desert advances. In Sicily, however, General Patton had twice used the command of the sea flank as he advanced along the northern coast of the island with great effect.”

I always considered these attacks to have been of extraordinary significance because first, they planted the seed of Anzio in the mind of Churchill, and second, they demonstrated a capacity for innovation in war on the part of Patton that I do not believe was possessed by any other high commander but MacArthur. And in using his sea power in this manner, he was motivated no doubt as much by a desire to reach Messina first as he was to try something new in tactics. At the time, he was striving mightily to reach Messina before Montgomery, who had been stalled around Catania for over a month. It was the beginning of a rivalry that persisted, usually in a friendly way, but sometimes bitterly, until the end of the war.

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AS THE war entered its final stages, coincidence brought the 2nd Armored and the 82nd Airborne Divisions, and General Patton and me, together once again. In March of 1945 I had orders to prepare for a parachute assault on Berlin. At the same time, the 2nd Armored Division was preparing plans for an armored attack through the Germans into the city. Unfortunately, for reasons still not clear to me, the operation was called off. Nevertheless, the 2nd Armored was the first division to occupy Berlin, and the 82nd Airborne Division relieved it immediately following the Potsdam Conference. At once an incident occurred in which General Patton played a characteristic role. As the American representative on the Kommandatura, I was told by the Soviet member that either the Americans or the Russians would lead the forthcoming victory parade in the city, but that neither the British nor the French would be acceptable to the Russians.

I replied that I would be happy to draw lots for position in the parade or to arrange ourselves alphabetically, in a diplomatic manner, using the French language as a base for determining our alphabetical position. My Soviet opposite number insisted that the Russians lead, and when I refused to agree, became incensed and said that we must see Marshal Zhukov, who at that time was at Potsdam.

We went out to see him, and after a rather heated discussion he threatened to call General Eisenhower. I assured him that my position would remain unchanged, and that was the last that I heard of the matter until the day of the parade. He must have called, however, because General Patton came to Berlin to be the senior U.S. Army officer present on the occasion. Marshal Zhukov arrived at the reviewing stand, resplendent with medals from his chin to his waist on both sides of his tunic. Shortly, George Patton arrived, equally dazzling, with his polished helmet and twenty stars, medals, and ivory-grip pistols.

After the introductions on the reviewing stand, there was some uncertainty about what would happen next. Suddenly, Marshal Zhukov jumped into his open-topped Ziv and started to review the nearby standing troops. In a split second George vaulted over the side of his open car, with me following in his wake, and we reviewed the troops beside Zhukov. As it finally turned out, this was the Russian idea of who was to be first in the parade. It was not a matter of who would march first, as was our custom, but rather what senior officer would review the troops before the parade began. So George protected the honor of his country, the feelings of our Allies were not hurt, and the Russians learned that George was not to be outdone.

Later that evening General Patton and I had dinner together with some other senior officers in Berlin. The conversation ranged through many subjects, as it always did with George. There was one thing that I particularly wanted to discuss with him – the problem of fraternization. Ever since we had crossed the borders of Germany, the troops had been admonished about the evils of fraternization. Understandably, the wives and sweethearts back home didn’t want the high command to countenance the troops’ hopping into bed with the fräuleins. Besides, there was much to hate the Germans for, and fraternization obviously was not compatible with hating – we were supposed to continue with the hating. So the necessary policy forbidding fraternization was promulgated and distributed through all the commands. Troop commanders were threatened with drastic punishment if they did not enforce the ban. The Stars and Stripes published articles from time to time about the dangers and impropriety of mixing it up with the fräuleins.

Meanwhile, to the troops, and especially to the 82nd Airborne veterans who had been at war more than three years and who had come all the way from Africa, the policy made little sense. Surely they hated the Germans, but what did that have to do with their relations with pretty fräuleins, of which there were many? There was much rationalizing about the subject. The reasoning among the troops went that if the big brass were worried about the troops being contaminated with Nazism, they could be rather formal about their relations with the fräuleins and perhaps this would not count as fraternization. For example, if they did not take off their airborne caps or their jump boots, the relationship would certainly be devoid of all politics.

In the final analysis, the ban was really unenforceable and placed the troop commanders in a very difficult position. I thought, therefore, that I would mention it to George since he usually had a rather good feel for what was going on in the minds of the troops. As a beginning I thought that I might point out what was really taking place and why it wasn‘t fraternization, as the higher command saw it; so I turned to him at the dinner table and said, “General, you know the troops really are not fraternizing.”

He turned quickly toward me, looked at me with amazement, and blurted, “Why, godamnit, Gavin, you’re as nutty as a fruitcake.” I didn‘t say another word. But the allure of fraternization to his troops had been on his mind, and Farago reports a telephone conversation that Patton had with General Bradley as he eagerly sought permission to carry the battle into Czechoslovakia.

Patton’s eagerness kept puzzling Bradley, so now he asked, “Why does everyone in the Third Army want to liberate the Czechs?”

Patton said nothing about the Russians. “Oh, Brad,” he answered, “can’t you see? The Czechs are our allies and consequently their women aren’t off limits. On to Czechoslovakia and fraternization!” he yelled into the telephone. “How in hell can you stop an army with a battle cry like that?”

GENERAL PATTON was a rambunctious, flamboyant officer with mannerisms intended to impress his troops. He had the wit, as Field Marshal Rommel once expressed it, to make himself distinctive, so that he stood out at all times and was recognized by soldiers wherever he appeared. He liked to talk to junior officers about the rather ordinary problems that sometimes perplexed them. Before D-Day in Normandy, he walked up to me in a London hotel lobby one day and said, “Gavin, do you think machine-gun ammunition should be loaded in belts with one round of tracer to every five or six rounds, or do you believe we should not have tracer mixed in with ball?” It was a matter that we had been arguing about, and I really don’t believe that he was particularly interested in my personal opinion, but it was characteristic of him to raise a subject for discussion in which he suspected that I might have an interest, as a basis for further conversation. Through this device, he frequently was able to talk to junior officers and enlisted men, and thus they got to know him better. Like all good professionals, however, he was very exacting of the troops under his command, and individuals from other commands entering his Third Army area frequently felt harassed by the penalties imposed upon them for such things as being in improper uniform or failing to salute.

We occasionally speculated about why George made such a spectacle of himself with his glossed helmet, ivory-handled pistols, and stars wherever he could properly place them on his uniform. We wondered why he felt that he should urinate off the first pontoon bridge over the Rhine River, or make forays not too far from enemy fire. A close mutual friend told me that George had assured him that he was more afraid of showing fear than anything else, and that since he knew fear often in battle, he behaved in this manner to cover up his true feelings. As Farago observes:

An intricate human being with an intellectual turn of mind, he discovered early in life that although he was brave, he was not altogether unquestioning in the face of danger.

He resolved to condition himself against fear, and set a course of training that seemed as reckless and foolish to the outsider as it was purposeful and systematic to him.

Farago’s biography is fascinating. It frequently reads as though it were fiction, and perhaps some of it is, for in places he often puts words into the mouths of his characters that seem impossible for him to have obtained from any authoritative source. There are strange omissions also, notably an incident much discussed at the time, when Patton launched a costly advance into Czechoslovakia that resulted in the rescue of his son-in-law, who had been in a German prisoner-of-war camp. But Farago’s biography moves along at a pace matched only by the dash and brilliance of Patton’s tank columns. His aggressiveness, while thoroughly respected by the Germans, was a frequent source of trouble to Eisenhower, who constantly was urged by Montgomery to make a main effort in the north. It reached the odd situation in the fall of 1944 where both sides were trying to hold back Patton. Farago describes it:

So the cry was “Hold Patton!” on both sides of the fence. It was undoubtedly the strangest and most paradoxical situation of the entire war. Eisenhower had given orders to hold Patton exactly when Hitler had issued identical orders!

Since Patton seemed to thrive on argument and opposition, Generals Bradley and Eisenhower are frequently cast in rather unflattering roles. Bradley was a sagacious commander, who sought always to balance risk with probable achievement, while at the same time, he held his casualties to a minimum. To Patton, this was sometimes unpardonable conservatism, which, he reasoned, in the long run would cost more lives. So the tug of war for divisions, gasoline, freedom to undertake new missions went on between the two, while Eisenhower had to weigh the requests of Montgomery on the north against the insistent demands of Patton on the south. Like many of the admirers of Patton, Farago believed without reservation that if Patton had been given the resources that he demanded, the war could have been ended in the fall of 1944. Having commanded a division in the Nijmegen-Arnhem airborne assault under Montgomery’s command in the fall of 1944, I believed then, and I do now, that with an additional corps, Montgomery could have broken into the North German plain and brought an end to the war. But the record suggests that in dealing with two strong-willed characters such as Patton and Montgomery, Eisenhower seemed unwilling to suppress either totally, and thus neither was given all the resources available, while both sought to advance the attack in their own sectors. Perhaps Eisenhower should have relieved Patton of his command at this time, but such a decision was unthinkable, as indeed it was for Lee to relieve Longstreet at Gettysburg for an entirely different reason. War is waged by men, not automatons, and human relations frequently override tactical considerations. We shall never know whether the war could have been brought to a victorious end in ‘44, and the historians will argue this point for many years.

The war entered the bitter winter of 1944-1945, and the Battle of the Bulge broke upon us. It was an opportunity for one of Patton’s finest achievements, the swing of an entire field army through ninety degrees, on very short notice, to launch an attack on the beleaguered bastion of Bastogne. Bastogne is a brilliant monument to Patton’s capacity as an Army commander, and Farago tells the Bastogne story in a fast-moving style, a style that surges ahead with a racing description of Patton’s armored sweeps. Critics will take exception to some parts of this biography, but I consider it to be a fair representation of Patton as he was. I hesitate to think of what Patton might have written had he lived long enough to write his autobiography, but the possibility leads us to General Mac Arthur’s Reminiscences (McGraw-Hill).

VIEWED as a whole, Reminiscences is quite unlike any other military autobiography that I can recall, and we have had quite a few autobiographies written by our generals in the past. There is about it a self-righteousness and an air of infallibility that become a bit irksome. Further, General MacArthur uses incidents to support his anxieties that are questionable. For example, recounting the events leading to his climactic dismissal, he cites as evidence of President Truman’s having lost his nerve the President’s famous letter to the music critic Paul Hume in December of 1950. In it the President threatened bodily harm to Mr. Hume for his poor review of his daughter’s singing. Going on, MacArthur observes, “I realized that I was standing at the apex of a situation that could make me the next victim of such an uncontrolled passion.”

Actually, he was not relieved until April 11, 1951, and then after a series of events that surely would have been irritating to any President. In addition there are a surprising number of almost direct quotes from other biographies of MacArthur, notably General Whitney’s, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with Destiny. It has been suggested by William Styron, writing in the New York Review, that MacArthur’s style was “lusterless Eisenhowerese which is so favored by corporation executives and which may be the result of MacArthur’s later years at Remington Rand.” All of which causes one to wonder if, in part, the overall tenor of his book is not attributable to his advanced years. Surely he could have written a better book ten years earlier. As it is, the cumulative impact is one that does not do justice to the General as a person or to his extraordinary career as a public servant. A better biography of MacArthur will be written.

I was a lieutenant attending the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, when Douglas MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. It was at this time that he personally went into the streets of Washington to take responsibility for the evacuation of the bonus marchers. Incidentally, he took with him two majors, Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton. He describes the events leading up to the bonus march and the evacuation itself in his Reminiscences. It has been a much-writtenabout subject, but I have never read anywhere the feeling of the junior officers toward MacArthur’s participation. We all felt that it was a gesture of personal responsibility on his part, and it was deeply appreciated by us. It was an act that certainly could have destroyed him in the public mind. Using the Army against our veterans was unthinkable, but this he was directed to do. He didn’t delegate the responsibility: instead he, Chief of Staff no less, strode into the midst of the affair and took full responsibility for what was taking place. It was characteristic of him, and for this he was thoroughly respected. But the difference between him and Patton was also quite apparent. Although MacArthur was present, he really wasn‘t part of the operation. There was an aloofness about him that always kept him remote from the juniors even though they were in close physical proximity. A few years after the bonus march, I served with the Philippine Scouts, a pre-World War II force that became part of MacArthur’s Bataan army. I remember MacArthur’s visiting us at Fort McKinley on Luzon to watch some test firings of a new 81-millimeter mortar. We were observing mortar fire from high ground when he strode up in a rather imperious way. There was an aura about him that seemed to keep us junior officers at some distance. When he did talk to us, it was obvious that it was the general talking to a lieutenant or a captain rather than a fellow soldier discussing a professional problem. But he was impressive, and in his own way inspired great confidence and tremendous respect. We knew him by reputation to be a man of great physical courage and by professional behavior to be a man of vision, intelligence, and great moral courage.

The fortunes of war took me to Africa and Europe instead of to the Pacific Theater, and I did not see General MacArthur again until the Inchon landing. I participated in the operation with several scientists as members of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. Our main purpose in being there was to look into the shortcomings of our tactical air power, which it had been assumed prior to Korea would stop any North Korean offensive in its tracks. I was on the outskirts of Inchon on a hill with “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Regiment of Marines when the MacArthur entourage arrived. The scene was almost exactly the same as it had been fifteen years earlier in the Philippine Islands. The erect, long-striding, buoyant General, in complete control of the situation and of himself, exuded confidence and left absolutely no question that the operation was a great success and that he knew exactly why and what he was going to do next. Disdainful of physical danger as usual, he went forward to look at some T-34 Soviet tanks with their cargo of dead North Koreans draped over them and about them; they had been knocked out of action only a few minutes earlier.

Later I was to have an opportunity to talk to MacArthur in his office in the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo. He greeted me warmly, sat me down, and began to talk to me about airborne warfare. This was characteristic of him. He obviously had studied the European airborne operations, knew the units that had participated and the recent maneuvers in the United States, and was aware ol what I had written about the future of airborne operations. He began by saying that after the North Korean attack began, remembering the reports on the 82nd Airborne Division on recent maneuvers in the United States, he asked for it to be flown to the Pacific at once. This request had been denied. He went on to say, however, that the only way to win in future combat was to fly a thousand miles behind the enemy’s fortified areas and organize a huge airhead, and thus get to his vitals at once and destroy him where he is most vulnerable. I was fascinated and at the same time rather alarmed.

Prior to the Normandy landings, when I was General Eisenhower’s senior airborne adviser in London, General Marshall sent over a proposal that the airborne divisions be landed in the Orleans Gap, the area between the headwaters of the Seine and Loire rivers in which the city of Orleans is located. It was assumed that by sealing off this area, while at the same time destroying the bridges over the two rivers, all the German forces could be cut off and destroyed. This was practically all that the Germans had in northwest France. The thing that shook those of us with Sicilian and Italian experience was our extreme vulnerability to armored attack, for paratroopers had nothing adequate to deal with the Panther, Tiger, and the Royal Tiger tanks of the German Panzer forces. Courage alone was not enough to punch a hole in six inches of armor. The shells of the small bazooka with which we were equipped often bounced off and in nearly all cases failed to penetrate. The nearest thing to an antitank weapon that we had was the British six pounder, and that had to be landed by glider, and its only real advantage was the distance at which it could engage a tank compared with the bazooka. We were likely to enjoy overwhelming air superiority, but this was of little avail at night; hence the likelihood of the Orleans airhead seizure’s being successful was extremely low even though as a map exercise it appeared to show great promise. The concept was daring, the courage would have been present in abundance, but the tactical weapons to succeed were totally lacking. After this proposal was rejected, the pendulum swung far in the opposite direction, and for a while much consideration was given to dropping small packets of paratroopers all along the beaches to knock out specific small tactical units. One of my Air Force colleagues at the time described it, saying that it was like “sending Michelangelo to paint the barn.” The final solution that succeeded so well was between the two extremes.

But returning to my conversations with General MacArthur, or rather General MacArthur’s dissertation to me, his concept was very daring and under some specific tactical conditions might succeed, but at the time we lacked the tactical means to make a success of such a deep penetration. In World War II MacArthur’s exploitation of our superior sea power had been extraordinarily successful; now he was thinking of the use of air power for the same purpose: avoidance of frontal assault through vertical envelopment. More than any other commander in World War II, he understood the costliness of the direct assault and the need to exploit the media in which we had supremacy. In his Reminiscences, reporting a meeting with President Roosevelt at Pearl Harbor in 1943, he says, “The days of the frontal attack should be over. Modern infantry weapons are too deadly, and frontal assault is only for mediocre commanders.”

My meeting with him had been a stimulating, indeed for me a memorable, occasion. But more important to me than the views that the General expressed was the fact that he had gone to such trouble to look into my own particular interests and ideas. Visitors frequently, if not usually, left his office absolutely overwhelmed with General MacArthur’s sympathetic understanding of their point of view on particular problems. Both by his personality, especially his articulate forceful manner of speech, and his grasp of a subject, he was inclined to be overwhelming. And when I walked out of his office and passed by the desk of one of the junior staff officers whom I had known in the service for many years, he said, without trying to be humorous or sarcastic, “Now, you have met God.” There is no doubt that MacArthur was an extraordinary general with great gifts of courage and intellect and one of the truly great captains of our time. For these reasons I regret that his memoirs do not portray the man that he was more sympathetically and more accurately.

IN HIS Reminiscences his controversy with President Truman comes through clearly as it builds up to the climactic moment of his recall. In the conduct of foreign policy, in the prosecution of our military plans to support that policy, and in domestic politics, President Truman and General MacArthur were in conflict. The first problem confronting them both was the administration of Japan. President Truman’s memoirs expressed the view that he was determined not to allow the Russians to have any part in the control of Japan. On the other hand, MacArthur alleges that the United States surrendered its unilateral authority to administer Japan to a Far Eastern Commission.

Referring to the commission, he writes, “They met in Tokyo and were, I suppose, to oversee my supervision of the Occupation.” MacArthur saw to it that the commission became hardly more than an advisory body, but not before he had an open split with the State Department. The State Department, in justifying its participation in the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission, alleged that MacArthur had approved the plan. This he strongly disagreed with, and, as he expresses it in his Reminiscences, “The State Department thereupon acknowledged the error and confirmed the accuracy of my denial.”

I was particularly interested in how he handled the Soviet representative in Tokyo. I had been the senior United States representative on the Kommandatura in Berlin from the summer of 1945 until my departure in late November of the same year. It had been a frustrating experience as the Soviets sought to gain administrative and military control of the city despite the responsibilities of the United States and our Allies. In Tokyo, when the Soviets realized that MacArthur was conducting the Occupation in his own way without consulting them, they sent their representative to call on him. MacArthur reports the meeting:

General Derevyanko became almost abusive and threatened that the Soviet Union would see to it that I would be dismissed as supreme commander. He went so far as to say Russian forces would move in whether I approved or not. I told him that if a single Soviet soldier entered Japan without my authority, I would at once throw the entire Russian Mission, including himself, into jail. He listened and stared as though he could not believe his own ears, and then said politely enough, “By God, I believe you would.”

And so the Russians were not permitted to dabble in the affairs of the Occupation Government, and Japan today is much the better for it. On a recent visit to Tokyo, where I attended the 1964 Olympics, a Japanese said to me, “General, there is one thing we Japanese people will always be grateful to you Americans for; you saved us from Soviet occupation.”

MacArthur had a conflict of view with Washington on the possible use of the Chinese forces on Formosa, views that he frequently aired in public. The issue was brought sharply to public attention by a letter on the subject that he wrote to Congressman Martin. The letter was released, to the embarrassment of the Administration, which at that time was struggling to hold together the support of our Allies in the Korean effort. To retain their support, we had to assure them that we had no intention of extending the war to the mainland of Asia. The UN commander in the field, however, appeared to be advocating the contrary.

It is clear from his Reminiscences that MacArthur was incapable of differentiating between what he considered to be national objectives and the objectives of the United Nations. Commenting upon our entry into the Korean affair, he writes, “The American tradition had always been that once our troops are committed to battle, the full power and means of the nation would he mobilized and dedicated to fight for victory– not for stalemate or compromise.” The mandate from the United Nations clearly limited the General’s actions to Korea. This brought into collision a military philosophy, developed during a brilliant career, with the limitations of coalition warfare in the nuclear age. The world had changed faster than he had realized. Our Allies had hardly recovered from the catastrophic damage of World War II, and now nuclear weapons posed an even greater danger. No longer could a nation act unilaterally and solely in its self-interest, nor could its commander in the field. And this state of affairs came about at the very time that General MacArthur was culminating a decade of decision making, both in war and peace, in which he had had the traditional freedom of action that we give to our Army commanders. And in the end he had to go, and Mr. Truman was unquestionably right in relieving him of his command.


Unfortunately, word of his relief came to him over a radio news broadcast under such circumstances, as he described it, that it “practically placed me under duress. No office boy, no charwoman, no servant of any sort would have been dismissed with such callous disregard for the ordinary decencies.”

And so, he returned as an old soldier to fade away, but he will not fade away, nor will the controversy. And it will be remembered when the McClellan-Lincoln controversy has been forgotten. There is much yet to be known about MacArthur and the reasons for President Truman’s attitude toward him. For example, more information about MacArthur‘s political aspirations as well as his correspondence with his supporters in the Republican Party would add significantly to an understanding of the controversy. And when all the facts on the Chinese intervention are in, when we know, if we ever do know, how much of MacArthur’s plans reached his opponents through our Allies in the United Nations, then we will be in a better position to judge his service in the Korean affair.

While many are inclined to judge both MacArthur and Patton in terms of civilian standards of behavior, one should realize that they devoted their entire lives to one purpose: to be prepared for war and to win a war, if one should occur. In the lifetime of both generals we changed many things about our government; we conducted our business affairs, wrote our books and painted our pictures, raised our families, and pursued a way of life that offered much to free men. And when this way of life was challenged, we had in the ranks of our Armed Forces the Pattons and MacArthurs who served us well. There may have been many shortcomings in our institutions, and perhaps other aspects of our daily lives, but when the issue of war chilled the hearts of our people, there was one thing that was not lacking: their generalship.





1965年2月号
探究
两位战斗的将军。巴顿和麦克阿瑟
作为成为一名出色的战斗将军和驻法国大使的前奏，詹姆斯-M-加文在宾夕法尼亚州的矿区小镇上以采煤和卖报纸为生，在两次大战之间加入了正规军，没有受过高中教育就进入了西点军校，学会了飞行，然后帮助开创了空降步兵的发展。现在，57岁的他是阿瑟-D-利特尔公司的董事会主席，该公司是美国最全面的研究公司之一。

作者：詹姆斯-M-加文
1965年2月号
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太阳缓缓升起，仿佛从火炉中升起，然后迅速在西西里岛的乡村散发出热量。那是1943年7月13日的早晨，我正乘吉普车前往杰拉。当我开到俯瞰大海的高地上时，乔治-巴顿将军站在那里，象牙柄的手枪和所有的东西，俯瞰着港口的繁忙景象。当我来到他面前时，他仍然握着一把M-1步枪，他拿出一个巨大的银色酒壶，说："加文，你看起来需要喝一杯。来一杯吧。"

四天前的晚上，我通过降落伞在敌方防线后方登陆，距离杰拉以东约75英里，第二天晚上带着少数伞兵穿过我们的防线，先是接上了第82空降师的一个排，然后是一个伞兵营，并与后来被证明是赫尔曼-戈林装甲师的作战指挥部交战。我在其中忙碌了两天，终于在第四天向杰拉进发，路过燃烧的坦克、相当多的尸体和大面积拆毁的路障。

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大约一周前，当我们还在北非时，巴顿将军给我们做了一次送行谈话。他在这种场合的谈话通常都很好，很朴实，我印象深刻。他说的一件事一直让我记忆犹新，因为它与我在那一刻之前的想法相反，但在参加战斗不久后，我知道他是对的。一天下午，当我们在北非的夕阳下集合时，他对我们所有人说："现在，我希望你们记住，没有一个狗娘养的通过为他的国家牺牲而赢得战争。他是通过让其他可怜的蠢货为他的国家牺牲来赢得战争的。"

巴顿接着讨论了我们在与德国人和意大利人作战时应该采用的战术，特别强调了意大利人的战术。他想说的是，我们应该避免直接攻击敌人的阵地，而是寻求包围他的侧翼。然而，将军在这样做的时候，使用了适用于性关系的术语。他以一种非常巧妙的方式强调，当我们到达他们一个阵地的后方时，意大利人总是会迅速地试图转换到一个新的阵地来保护自己，而在那一刻，他们会变得很容易受到我们从后方的攻击。与其说他说了什么，不如说他是如何说的，这使我们记住了他想要表达的观点--尽管我有时确实感到有些尴尬，而且我感觉到一些部队也感到有些尴尬了。拉迪斯拉斯-法拉戈在《巴顿。Ordeal and Triumph (Obolensky)一书中描述了部队对他谈话的反应。"他们对他精心制作的色情演讲感到好笑，但也感到脸红"。但将军提出了他的观点，他们记住了这些观点，因为他使用的语言和内容一样多。

巴顿将军指挥美国第七军攻打西西里岛。这是他一生都渴望得到的指挥权；他的一生是动荡的一生，从1909年从西点军校毕业那天起，直到第二次世界大战结束后不久他在德国英年早逝。乔治-巴顿从来不是一个会保留意见的人，也不会从他的恐惧中接受建议，他是一个不安分、不耐烦的和平时期的士兵。他打手球、打马球--他是一个七分球的人--和写作都消耗了他的大部分精力。当他不做这些事情的时候，他就在驾驶他的游艇，或给服务杂志写他所预见的战争，或做他所擅长的许多事情中的任何一件。当他被选为他的第一个装甲部队指挥官时，有很多人怀疑，因为他多年来一直被称为马匹骑兵的爱好者。然而，很少有人意识到，他曾在第一次世界大战中出色地指挥过坦克装甲部队。

乔治-C-马歇尔将军曾在第一次世界大战中与他一起服役，他不仅欣赏他的坦克背景，还欣赏他所从事的一切工作中所具有的充满活力的领导品质。法拉戈描述了马歇尔将军如何预见到对他卓越的领导能力的需求，在1938年10月将他从几乎肯定退休的状态中挑选出来，带到弗吉尼亚州的迈尔堡，然后将他送到佐治亚州本宁堡的第一个装甲部队指挥部。巴顿将军在佐治亚州本宁堡指挥第二装甲师，当时我指挥的是第505伞兵步兵团，在同一个哨所，但在查塔霍奇河的阿拉巴马一侧。来自两个司令部的部队的共同聚集地是菲尼克斯市和哥伦布市之间的河上桥梁。它们是一些相当严重的突击行动的现场，从中产生了一定程度的相互尊重。在二战中我们在西西里岛的第一场重大战役中，我们发现自己与第二装甲部队联合在一起，伞兵们今天仍然坚持认为，他们与西西里人一起在路边排队，在第二装甲部队占领巴勒莫时为其鼓掌。

巴顿对该岛西端的扫荡既振奋人心，又让美国的装甲装备爱好者们感到放心。然而，当他的部队向东向墨西拿推进时，随着崎岖的地形向大海靠近，他们最终开始穿过一个狭窄的漏斗。正是在这个时候，雷德韦将军和我在巴勒莫的总部拜访了巴顿，考虑使用降落伞部队与拟议中的两栖终结行动合作。我们最终同意，地形对伞兵的可能性限制太大，但尽管如此，巴顿还是成功地发动了两次两栖攻击。温斯顿-丘吉尔（Winston Churchill）长期以来一直主张利用盟军的优势海上力量，他对此很感兴趣，法拉戈在提到这些两栖作战的政变时，引用了丘吉尔的话。

他写道："我当然一直是美国人所称的'终结者'的拥护者，""或'猫爪'，这是我的说法。我从未成功地将这种向海上力量开放的演习纳入我们的任何沙漠推进行动中。然而，在西西里岛，巴顿将军在沿该岛北部海岸推进时曾两次使用了海上侧翼的指挥权，取得了巨大的效果。"

我一直认为这些攻击具有非同寻常的意义，因为首先，它们在丘吉尔心中埋下了安齐奥的种子，其次，它们显示了巴顿在战争中的创新能力，我认为除了麦克阿瑟之外，其他任何高级指挥官都没有这种能力。在以这种方式使用他的海上力量时，他的动机无疑是希望首先到达墨西拿，而不是在战术上尝试新东西。当时，他正极力争取在蒙哥马利之前到达墨西拿，而蒙哥马利已经在卡塔尼亚附近停滞了一个多月。这是一场竞争的开始，这种竞争一直持续到战争结束，通常是以友好的方式，但有时也很激烈。

当战争进入最后阶段时，巧合使第二装甲师和第82空降师，以及巴顿将军和我，再次走到一起。1945年3月，我接到命令，准备对柏林进行伞兵突击。与此同时，第二装甲师正在准备通过德军向该市发动装甲攻击的计划。不幸的是，由于我仍然不清楚的原因，该行动被取消了。尽管如此，第二装甲师是第一个占领柏林的师，在波茨坦会议之后，第82空降师立即解救了它。一下子就发生了一件事，巴顿将军在其中扮演了一个特有的角色。作为共青团的美国代表，苏联成员告诉我，美国人或俄国人将领导即将在该市举行的胜利游行，但英国人或法国人都不能为俄国人所接受。

我回答说，我很乐意抽签决定我们在阅兵式上的位置，或者以外交方式按字母顺序排列，以法语作为确定我们字母位置的基础。我的苏联对头坚持由俄国人领导，当我拒绝同意时，他变得很生气，说我们必须见朱可夫元帅，他当时在波茨坦。

我们出去见他，在一次相当激烈的讨论之后，他威胁说要给艾森豪威尔将军打电话。我向他保证，我的立场将保持不变，这是我最后一次听到此事，直到阅兵那天。不过，他一定是打了电话，因为巴顿将军来到柏林，成为出席这一场合的美军高级官员。朱可夫元帅来到检阅台前，从下巴到腰部的外衣两侧都挂着勋章，光彩夺目。不久，乔治-巴顿也来了，他的头盔擦得锃亮，带着20颗星、奖章和象牙握把的手枪，同样令人目眩。

在检阅台上做完介绍后，人们对接下来会发生什么感到有些不确定。突然，朱可夫元帅跳进他的敞篷Ziv，开始检阅附近的站立部队。在一瞬间，乔治从他的敞篷车边跳了过去，我跟在他后面，我们在朱可夫身边检阅部队。最后发现，这就是俄国人关于谁在阅兵式上第一个出场的想法。这并不是像我们的习惯那样谁先走，而是在阅兵开始前由哪位高级军官检阅部队的问题。因此，乔治保护了他的国家的荣誉，我们盟国的感情没有受到伤害，而俄国人则了解到乔治是不可能被超越的。

当天晚上，巴顿将军和我在柏林与其他一些高级军官共进晚餐。谈话涉及许多话题，就像和乔治在一起时一样。有一件事我特别想和他讨论--兄弟关系问题。自从我们越过德国边境后，部队就一直被告诫要注意交心的害处。可以理解的是，家乡的妻子和爱人并不希望最高统帅部同意部队与女郎跳床。此外，有很多事情需要憎恨德国人，而联谊显然与憎恨不相容--我们应该继续憎恨。因此，禁止联谊的必要政策被颁布，并在所有的指挥部分发。部队指挥官受到威胁，如果他们不执行该禁令，将受到严厉的惩罚。星条旗报》不时发表文章，介绍与女郎混在一起的危险和不妥之处。

同时，对部队来说，特别是对已经打了三年多的、从非洲远道而来的第82空降师老兵来说，这个政策没有什么意义。当然，他们憎恨德国人，但这与他们与漂亮的女郎的关系有什么关系呢，而这些女郎有很多。在这个问题上有很多合理化建议。部队中的推论是，如果高层担心部队受到纳粹主义的污染，他们可以对自己与女郎的关系采取相当正式的态度，也许这就不算是博爱了。例如，如果他们不脱掉空降帽或跳伞靴，这种关系就肯定没有任何政治色彩。

归根结底，这项禁令确实无法执行，使部队指挥官处于非常困难的境地。因此，我想，我应该向乔治提及此事，因为他通常对部队中发生的事情有相当好的感觉。作为一个开端，我想我可以指出到底发生了什么，以及为什么在上级指挥部看来，这不是兄弟关系；于是我在餐桌上转向他说："将军，你知道部队真的没有兄弟关系。"

他迅速转向我，惊讶地看着我，大声说："为什么，天哪，加文，你就像一个水果蛋糕一样疯狂。" 我没有再说话。但是亲情化对他的部队的诱惑力一直在他的脑海中，法拉戈报告了巴顿与布拉德利将军的一次电话交谈，当时他急切地寻求允许将战斗带入捷克斯洛伐克境内。

巴顿的急切心情一直让布雷德利感到困惑，所以现在他问道："为什么第三军的每个人都想解放捷克人？"

巴顿没有说俄国人的事。"哦，布拉德，"他回答说，"你看不出来吗？捷克人是我们的盟友，因此他们的女人也不是禁区。在捷克斯洛伐克和博爱方面！"他对着电话大喊。"你怎么能用这样的战斗口号来阻止一支军队？"

彭定康将军是一个狂热的、张扬的军官，他的举止旨在给他的部队留下深刻印象。正如隆美尔元帅曾经说过的那样，他有一种使自己与众不同的智慧，因此他在任何时候都很突出，无论他出现在哪里都能被士兵们认出来。他喜欢和下级军官讨论有时让他们感到困惑的相当普通的问题。在诺曼底的D日之前，有一天他在伦敦一家酒店的大厅里走到我面前说："加文，你认为机枪弹药是否应该装在皮带上，每5或6发子弹有一发曳光弹，或者你认为我们不应该把曳光弹混在球里？" 这是我们一直在争论的问题，我真的不相信他对我的个人意见特别感兴趣，但他的特点是提出一个他怀疑我可能有兴趣的讨论主题，作为进一步谈话的基础。通过这种手段，他经常能够与下级军官和士兵交谈，从而使他们更了解他。然而，像所有优秀的专业人员一样，他对他指挥的部队要求非常严格，来自其他指挥部的人进入他的第三军区，经常会因为穿着不合适的军装或没有敬礼等原因而受到惩罚，感到很麻烦。

我们偶尔会猜测，为什么乔治要用他那光亮的头盔、象牙柄的手枪，以及他可以在军装上适当放置的星星，使自己变得如此引人注目。我们想知道为什么他觉得应该在莱茵河上的第一座浮桥上撒尿，或者在离敌人火力不太远的地方进行突击。一位共同的亲密朋友告诉我，乔治曾向他保证，他更害怕表现出恐惧，而不是其他什么，由于他知道在战斗中经常出现恐惧，所以他以这种方式来掩盖他的真实感受。正如法拉戈所观察到的。

他是一个具有智慧的复杂的人，他在生命的早期就发现，虽然他很勇敢，但在面对危险时，他并不是完全不怀疑。

他决心使自己免受恐惧之苦，并制定了一套训练方案，在外人看来，这套方案既鲁莽又愚蠢，而对他来说则是有目的、有计划的。

法拉戈的传记很吸引人。它经常读起来好像是小说，也许有些是，因为在一些地方，他经常把他的人物嘴里的话说出来，而他似乎不可能从任何权威来源获得这些话。也有一些奇怪的遗漏，特别是当时讨论较多的一个事件，即巴顿向捷克斯洛伐克发动了一次代价高昂的进军，结果救出了他的女婿，他曾被关在德国战俘营。但法拉戈的传记以一种只有巴顿的坦克纵队的冲刺和辉煌才能匹配的速度前进。他的侵略性，虽然受到德国人的彻底尊重，但却经常给艾森豪威尔带来麻烦，他不断被蒙哥马利敦促在北部进行主要努力。1944年秋天达到了奇怪的局面，双方都在试图阻止巴顿。法拉戈描述道。

于是，两边都在喊 "拖住巴顿！"。这无疑是整个战争中最奇怪和最矛盾的情况。艾森豪威尔正是在希特勒发出同样的命令时，下达了扣留巴顿的命令！这无疑是整个战争中最奇怪和最矛盾的情况。

由于巴顿似乎在争论和反对中茁壮成长，布拉德利将军和艾森豪威尔将军经常被投以相当不光彩的角色。布拉德利是一位聪明的指挥官，他总是寻求在风险和可能的成就之间取得平衡，同时，他将伤亡控制在最低限度。对巴顿来说，这有时是不可原谅的保守主义，他认为，从长远来看，这将付出更多的生命。因此，为争夺师团、汽油和执行新任务的自由而进行的拉锯战在两人之间展开，而艾森豪威尔不得不权衡蒙哥马利在北方的要求和巴顿在南方的执着要求。像许多巴顿的崇拜者一样，法拉戈毫无保留地相信，如果巴顿能得到他所要求的资源，战争本可以在1944年秋天结束。1944年秋天，我曾在蒙哥马利指挥的奈梅亨-阿纳姆空降突击战中指挥过一个师，当时我相信，现在我也相信，如果再有一个军团，蒙哥马利就可以突入北德平原，结束战争。但记录表明，在处理巴顿和蒙哥马利这样两个意志坚强的人物时，艾森豪威尔似乎不愿意完全压制这两个人，因此这两个人都没有得到所有可用的资源，而都试图在他们自己的地区推进进攻。也许艾森豪威尔应该在这个时候解除巴顿的指挥权，但这样的决定是不可想象的，就像李在盖茨堡出于完全不同的原因解除朗斯特里特的指挥权一样。战争是由人发动的，而不是自动的，人与人之间的关系经常凌驾于战术考虑之上。我们将永远不知道这场战争是否能在44年胜利结束，历史学家们将在许多年里争论这一点。

战争进入了1944-1945年的严冬，突出部战役向我们袭来。这是巴顿最出色的成就之一的机会，他在很短的时间内将整个野战军摆成九十度，向巴斯通这个被围困的堡垒发起进攻。巴斯通是巴顿作为陆军指挥官能力的一座辉煌的纪念碑，法拉戈以一种快速移动的风格讲述了巴斯通的故事，这种风格通过对巴顿的装甲扫荡进行飞快的描述而向前推进。批评者会对这本传记的某些部分提出异议，但我认为它是对巴顿本人的公正表述。如果巴顿活得足够长，可以写自传的话，我犹豫不决，但这种可能性让我们看到了麦克-阿瑟将军的《回忆》（McGraw-Hill）。

从整体上看，《回忆》与我印象中的任何其他军事自传都不一样，过去我们的将军们也写过不少自传。这本书有一种自以为是和无懈可击的气质，让人有点不舒服。此外，麦克阿瑟将军用一些值得怀疑的事件来支持他的焦虑。例如，在叙述导致他被解职的事件时，他引用了1950年12月总统给音乐评论家保罗-休姆的那封著名的信作为杜鲁门总统失去勇气的证据。在信中，总统威胁要对休姆先生进行人身伤害，因为他对他女儿的演唱评价不佳。麦克阿瑟继续说："我意识到，我正站在一个可能使我成为这种不受控制的激情的下一个受害者的情况的顶点。

实际上，他直到1951年4月11日才被解除职务，而且是在发生了一系列肯定会让任何总统感到恼火的事件之后。此外，书中还有大量几乎直接引用麦克阿瑟其他传记的内容，特别是惠特尼将军的《麦克阿瑟：他与命运的约会》。威廉-斯泰伦在《纽约评论》中写道，麦克阿瑟的风格是 "没有光泽的Eisenhowerese，这是公司高管所喜欢的，这可能是麦克阿瑟晚年在Remington Rand工作的结果"。所有这些都让人怀疑，在某种程度上，他的书的整体基调是不是归因于他的晚年。当然，他可以在十年前就写出一本更好的书。就像现在这样，累积起来的影响是，对将军这个人或他作为公务员的非凡生涯来说，并不公正。一个更好的麦克阿瑟传记将会被写出来。

道格拉斯-麦克阿瑟担任美国陆军参谋长时，我是一名在佐治亚州本宁堡步兵学校学习的中尉。正是在这个时候，他亲自走到华盛顿的街头，负责疏散红军的游行者。顺便说一下，他带着两位少校，德怀特-D-艾森豪威尔和乔治-S-巴顿。他在《回忆录》中描述了导致奖金游行的事件和疏散本身。这是一个被写得很多的话题，但我从未在任何地方读到下级军官对麦克阿瑟的参与的感受。我们都觉得这是他个人责任的一种姿态，我们对此深为赞赏。这是一个肯定会在公众心目中摧毁他的行为。利用军队来对付我们的退伍军人是不可想象的，但这是他受命去做的。他没有把责任下放：相反，他作为参谋长，大步走到事件中间，对正在发生的事情负起全部责任。这是他的特点，为此他受到了彻底的尊重。但他和巴顿之间的区别也很明显。虽然麦克阿瑟也在场，但他真的不是行动的一部分。他有一种冷漠的态度，使他总是与后辈们保持距离，尽管他们在身体上很接近。红军行军几年后，我在菲律宾童子军中服役，这是一支二战前的部队，成为麦克阿瑟巴丹军队的一部分。我记得麦克阿瑟到吕宋岛的麦金利堡看望我们，观看一种新的81毫米迫击炮的一些试射。我们正从高处观察迫击炮射击，他以一种相当傲慢的方式大步走来。他身上有一种光环，似乎让我们这些下级军官保持一定距离。当他和我们交谈时，很明显是将军在和一个中尉或上尉交谈，而不是一个讨论专业问题的士兵同伴。但他令人印象深刻，并以他自己的方式激发了巨大的信心和巨大的尊重。我们从声誉上知道他是一个具有巨大身体勇气的人，从职业行为上知道他是一个具有远见、智慧和巨大道德勇气的人。

战争的命运把我带到了非洲和欧洲，而不是太平洋战场，直到仁川登陆，我才再次见到麦克阿瑟将军。我和几位科学家作为武器系统评估小组的成员参加了这次行动。我们在那里的主要目的是研究我们的战术空中力量的缺陷，在朝鲜之前，人们认为这种力量可以阻止任何北朝鲜的进攻。当麦克阿瑟的随行人员到达时，我正和 "切斯蒂"-普勒的海军陆战队第一团在仁川郊区的一座山上。当时的情景与15年前在菲律宾群岛时的情景几乎一模一样。这位身姿挺拔、步履矫健、精神抖擞的将军完全控制了局势和自己，散发着自信的气息，绝对不会让人怀疑这次行动取得了巨大的成功，他很清楚为什么以及接下来要做什么。像往常一样，他对身体的危险不屑一顾，他走到前面去看一些T-34苏联坦克，上面和周围都挂着死去的朝鲜人的货物；这些坦克在几分钟前就被击溃了。

后来我有机会在麦克阿瑟位于东京大一楼的办公室与他交谈。他热情地接待了我，让我坐下，开始和我谈起空降战。这是他的特点。他显然研究过欧洲的空降作战，知道参加过的部队和最近在美国的演习，也知道我写过的关于空降作战的未来的文章。他首先说，在朝鲜的进攻开始后，想起关于第82空降师最近在美国的演习的报告，他要求立即将其空运到太平洋。这一要求被拒绝了。不过，他接着说，在未来的战斗中，唯一的取胜之道是飞到敌人的防御区后面一千英里处，组织一个巨大的空头，从而在第一时间到达他的要害，在他最脆弱的地方消灭他。我很着迷，同时也相当震惊。

在诺曼底登陆之前，当我在伦敦担任艾森豪威尔将军的高级空降顾问时，马歇尔将军送来了一份提案，建议空降师在奥尔良峡谷登陆，该地区位于塞纳河和卢瓦尔河的上游，奥尔良市就位于该地区。人们认为，通过封锁这一地区，同时摧毁两河上的桥梁，可以切断并摧毁所有的德军。这实际上是德军在法国西北部的全部力量。让我们这些有西西里和意大利经验的人感到震惊的是，我们极易受到装甲部队的攻击，因为伞兵们没有足够的东西来对付德国装甲部队的黑豹、虎式和皇家虎式坦克。仅靠勇气是不足以在六英寸的装甲上打出一个洞的。我们装备的小型火箭筒的炮弹经常被弹开，几乎在所有情况下都无法穿透。我们拥有的最接近反坦克武器的东西是英国的六磅炮，它必须通过滑翔机降落，而它唯一真正的优势是与火箭筒相比，它可以与坦克保持一定的距离。我们有可能享有压倒性的空中优势，但这在夜间没有什么用处；因此，奥尔良空港夺取行动成功的可能性极低，尽管作为一项地图演习，它似乎显示出巨大的前景。这个概念很大胆，勇气也很足，但完全缺乏成功的战术武器。在这一建议被否决后，钟摆向相反的方向摇摆，有一段时间，人们更多地考虑沿海滩投掷小包伞兵，以打掉特定的小型战术单位。当时我的一位空军同事描述说，这就像 "派米开朗基罗去画谷仓"。如此成功的最终解决方案是在这两个极端之间。

但回到我与麦克阿瑟将军的谈话，或者说是麦克阿瑟将军给我的论文，他的概念是非常大胆的，在一些特定的战术条件下可能会成功，但在当时我们缺乏战术手段，无法使这样的深度渗透取得成功。在第二次世界大战中，麦克阿瑟对我们优越的海上力量的利用取得了极大的成功；现在他正在考虑为同样的目的使用空中力量：通过垂直包围避免正面攻击。在第二次世界大战中，他比任何其他指挥官都更了解直接攻击的代价，以及利用我们拥有优势的媒体的必要性。在他的《回忆录》中，报告了1943年在珍珠港与罗斯福总统的一次会面，他说："正面进攻的日子应该结束了。现代步兵武器的杀伤力太大，正面进攻只适合平庸的指挥官。"

我与他的会面是一个激励人心的场合，对我来说确实是一个难忘的场合。但对我来说，比将军所表达的观点更重要的是，他不厌其烦地研究我的特殊兴趣和想法。来访者离开他的办公室时，经常会被麦克阿瑟将军对他们在特定问题上的观点的同情性理解所折服，如果不是通常的话。无论是他的个性，特别是他那铿锵有力的讲话方式，还是他对某一主题的把握，他都倾向于压倒性的。当我走出他的办公室，路过我在职场上认识多年的一位初级参谋的办公桌时，他不无幽默或讽刺地说道："现在，你已经见到了上帝"。毫无疑问，麦克阿瑟是一位非凡的将军，他有着巨大的勇气和智慧的天赋，是我们这个时代真正伟大的上尉之一。由于这些原因，我对他的回忆录没有更同情和更准确地描述他的为人感到遗憾。

在他的回忆录中，他与杜鲁门总统的争论清晰地呈现出来，因为它一直发展到他被召回的高潮时刻。在执行外交政策方面，在执行支持该政策的军事计划方面，以及在国内政治方面，杜鲁门总统和麦克阿瑟将军发生了冲突。他们俩面临的第一个问题是对日本的管理。杜鲁门总统的回忆录中表示，他决心不允许俄国人在控制日本方面有任何参与。另一方面，麦克阿瑟指称，美国将其管理日本的单边权力交给了远东委员会。

在提到该委员会时，他写道："他们在东京开会，我想，是为了监督我对占领的监督。" 麦克阿瑟看到，该委员会几乎没有成为一个咨询机构，但在他与国务院公开分裂之前。国务院在证明其参与设立远东委员会的理由时，声称麦克阿瑟批准了该计划。他对此表示强烈反对，正如他在《回忆录》中所说，"国务院随即承认了这个错误，并确认了我的否认的准确性"。

我对他如何处理苏联驻东京的代表特别感兴趣。从1945年夏天到同年11月底我离开，我一直是美国驻柏林委员会的高级代表。这是一次令人沮丧的经历，因为苏联不顾美国和我们盟国的责任，试图获得该城市的行政和军事控制。在东京，当苏联人意识到麦克阿瑟没有与他们协商就以自己的方式进行占领时，他们派代表去拜访了他。麦克阿瑟报告了这次会议。

Derevyanko将军变得近乎辱骂，并威胁说苏联将确保我的最高指挥官职务被解除。他甚至说，无论我同意与否，俄国军队都会进驻。我告诉他，如果有一个苏联士兵未经我授权进入日本，我将立即把整个俄罗斯代表团，包括他自己，扔进监狱。他听后瞪大了眼睛，仿佛不相信自己的耳朵，然后很有礼貌地说："上帝啊，我相信你会的。"

就这样，俄国人不被允许插手占领国政府的事务，而今天的日本也因此变得更好。在最近一次访问东京时，我在那里参加了1964年的奥运会，一个日本人对我说："将军，有一件事我们日本人将永远感谢你们美国人；你们把我们从苏联的占领中拯救出来。"

麦克阿瑟在可能使用中国在福摩萨的部队问题上与华盛顿有意见冲突，他经常在公开场合发表意见。他写给国会议员马丁的一封信使这个问题引起了公众的强烈关注。这封信被公布后，使政府感到尴尬，因为当时政府正在努力争取我们的盟国对朝鲜战争的支持。为了保持他们的支持，我们必须向他们保证，我们无意将战争扩大到亚洲大陆。然而，在战场上的联合国指挥官似乎主张相反的说法。

从他的回忆录中可以看出，麦克阿瑟没有能力区分他认为的国家目标和联合国的目标。在评论我们加入朝鲜事务时，他写道："美国的传统一直是，一旦我们的部队投入战斗，国家的全部力量和手段就会被调动起来，致力于为胜利而战--而不是为僵局或妥协而战。" 联合国的授权显然将将军的行动限制在朝鲜。这使他在辉煌的职业生涯中形成的军事理念与核时代的联合作战的局限性发生了碰撞。世界的变化比他意识到的要快。我们的盟国几乎没有从二战的灾难性破坏中恢复过来，而现在核武器带来了更大的危险。一个国家再也不能只从自己的利益出发，单方面采取行动，其战场上的指挥官也不能。而这种状况的出现，恰恰是麦克阿瑟将军在战争与和平中的十年决策达到顶峰的时候，在这十年中，他拥有我们赋予军队指挥官的传统行动自由。最后他不得不离开，杜鲁门先生解除了他的指挥权，这无疑是正确的。


不幸的是，他被解职的消息通过电台新闻广播传到了他的耳朵里，正如他所描述的那样，这种情况 "实际上是把我置于胁迫之下。没有一个办公室职员，没有一个女佣人，没有一个仆人会被如此冷酷无情地无视普通的礼节而被解雇。

就这样，他作为一个老兵回来了，要淡出人们的视线，但他不会淡出，这场争论也不会淡出。而且，当麦克莱伦-林肯之争被遗忘时，人们会记住它。关于麦克阿瑟以及杜鲁门总统对他的态度的原因，还有很多东西有待了解。例如，关于麦克阿瑟的政治抱负以及他与共和党支持者的通信的更多信息将大大增加对这场争论的理解。当所有关于中国干预的事实都出来了，当我们知道，如果我们真的知道，麦克阿瑟的计划有多少是通过我们在联合国的盟友传给他的对手的，那么我们就可以更好地判断他在朝鲜事件中的服务。

虽然许多人倾向于以平民的行为标准来评判麦克阿瑟和巴顿，但人们应该认识到，他们把自己的一生都献给了一个目的：为战争做好准备，并在战争发生时赢得战争。在两位将军的一生中，我们改变了许多关于政府的事情；我们处理我们的商业事务，写我们的书，画我们的画，养我们的家庭，并追求一种为自由人提供很多的生活方式。当这种生活方式受到挑战时，我们的武装部队中就有为我们服务的帕顿和麦克阿瑟。我们的机构可能有许多缺点，也许还有我们日常生活的其他方面，但当战争问题使我们的人民心寒时，有一样东西是不缺的：他们的将军精神。