2022.03.19 俄罗斯失去其 "能源超级大国 "地位

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Russia and Ukraine
Daniel Yergin on Russia losing its status as an “energy superpower”
The energy analyst and award-winning author of “The Prize” and “The New Map” says Vladimir Putin is destroying the foundation of his country’s economic power

Mar 19th 2022

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Vladimir putin once said that he did not like hearing Russia described as an “energy superpower”. It reminded him, he said, too much of the cold war. But he has revelled in what his country’s energy resources have brought him—global political clout and massive revenues. But the consequences of the Ukraine war will turn Russia into a “reduced energy power”.

This marks the end of an era that began three decades ago with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the years afterwards, for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian oil industry rebounded and largely integrated with the global industry. Today Russia is one of the top three oil producers in the world (after America and roughly equal with Saudi Arabia) and is also the world’s largest natural-gas exporter and second-largest producer, again after America.

In just a few weeks, Mr Putin has destroyed the internationalised economy he has been building for more than 20 years, as well as the reputation Russia has cultivated as a reliable supplier. It is now seen as an unreliable and largely unwanted energy source for Europe. In 2021 it supplied 29% of Europe’s total gas supplies and 35% of its oil. Although it remains a necessary supplier for now, its role is certain to diminish.

Unplugging Russia from the world economy with massive sanctions turns out to be a challenge. As an exporter, it is mainly a supplier of commodities and raw materials, none of them easily replaceable in an inflationary time. Oil and gas rank at the top of the list, accounting for half of total export earnings and, in some years, over 40% of Russia’s total budget.

Europe’s immediate need, now that winter is ending, is to ensure enough natural gas in storage for next winter, and for that it will need Russian supplies. Overall, however, Russia’s gas sales to Europe will shrink dramatically over the next five years. Europe will step up its push towards renewables, now for reasons of security as well as climate change. France has announced new nuclear power plants, and Europe is searching the world for more liquefied natural gas (LNG).

That market is tight, but America will be bringing on more capacity this year, making it the world’s largest LNG exporter. Europe will promote energy efficiency but also burn more coal, at least temporarily. The roll-out of electric vehicles will accelerate. Europe will need to expedite permission for new oil and gas production. “Yet-to-find” natural gas resources in Europe are estimated to be equivalent to decades worth of Russian gas exports to the continent. Russia will be able to pipe more to China, but will be stuck with a westward-running pipeline system into Europe operating far below capacity.

In a normal year, Russian oil exports generate more than three times the revenues of gas. But its oil exports are, so far, much more disrupted. About half of Russia’s 7.5m barrels per day of exports go to Europe. Though those exports were explicitly excluded from formal sanctions (until they were specifically targeted by America and Britain), they are being indirectly sanctioned and “self-sanctioned” by buyers, shippers, and insurance providers, as well as by the extreme reluctance of banks to provide trade finance. A new factor is now shaping oil markets: the force of public opinion horrified by the war in Ukraine and the resulting pressure on companies to step back from Russian oil.

This creates a dilemma for European countries: not buying Russian oil in response to a public enraged by the devastation in Ukraine, set against likely fuel shortages across the continent. Mr Putin thought he had leverage, launching the war when energy markets were very tight, expecting that EU countries would protest but stand aside. But this has proved a serious miscalculation. At this point it appears that Russian tanker loadings are down by 1m-2m barrels per day, and additional barrels are stuck at sea, unable to find a home.

Western governments, having rediscovered the concept of energy security, are scouring the world for additional supplies. They should plan on the basis that either the rejection of Russian oil will increase or that Mr Putin will wield the “oil weapon” and cut supplies. Whichever it is, they should be working much more closely with oil and gas companies to understand the changing logistics. To facilitate collaboration, they would do well to put aside the customary populist language about market manipulation usually invoked when prices go up.

This brings us to the question of fungibility, that strange word describing the ease (or not) of replacing one good with another. In theory, the oil market will readjust. Russian barrels no longer bound for Europe would go somewhere else, mainly to Asia, and barrels from elsewhere would come to Europe. Buyer countries such as India, which imports 85% of its oil, and China, will be eager to buy heavily-discounted Russian oil. But the complex system that moves about 100m barrels a day around the world is not easily rebalanced and will be snarled by new frictions, such as the difficulties of arranging finance and transport from Black Sea and Baltic ports, and the new sanctions. Bilateral payment systems that avoid the dollar would be needed, and barter may well return.

The OPEC-plus system, managed by Saudi Arabia and Russia, worked in a globalised market. But it will be difficult to hold together in a more Balkanised world in which countries will find it harder to “abstain” from choosing sides as they did in the recent UN vote condemning the invasion. Adding to the tension among exporters, countries in the Middle East will find themselves competing in the Asian market against an onslaught of cheaper Russian oil.

The investments that Western companies made in Russian energy over the past three decades were strongly encouraged by Western governments, which wanted to undergird the post-Soviet relationship with an economic foundation and, after the Gulf crisis of the early 1990s, bring more diverse supplies into the global market. Those companies are now leaving their investments in Russia. Companies from emerging markets will try to pick up the abandoned properties at bargain prices, while needing to take care to skirt sanctions. Russian energy companies are now cut off from international finance and flows of technology. All of this will mean that Russian oil and natural-gas production will decrease.

Mr Putin launched the war on the claim of “unity”, that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people”, and as an important step to achieve his grand ambition to reassert Russia as a great power. But what he has done, in addition to shattering any such unity, is to undermine and debase Russia’s most important source of economic power.■

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Daniel Yergin is author of "The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations". He is vice chairman of S&P Global and received the Pulitzer Prize for his book, "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power".



俄罗斯和乌克兰
丹尼尔-耶金谈俄罗斯失去其 "能源超级大国 "地位
这位能源分析家和《奖状》及《新地图》的获奖作者说，弗拉基米尔-普京正在破坏其国家经济实力的基础。

2022年3月19日



弗拉基米尔-普京曾经说过，他不喜欢听到俄罗斯被描述为一个 "能源超级大国"。他说，这让他想起了太多的冷战时期。但他一直陶醉于他的国家的能源资源给他带来的东西--全球政治影响力和大量收入。但乌克兰战争的后果将使俄罗斯变成一个 "被削弱的能源大国"。

这标志着三十年前随着苏联解体而开始的一个时代的结束。在此后的几年里，自布尔什维克革命以来，俄罗斯石油工业首次出现反弹，并在很大程度上与全球工业融合。今天，俄罗斯是世界三大石油生产国之一（仅次于美国，与沙特阿拉伯大致相当），也是世界最大的天然气出口国和第二大生产国，同样仅次于美国。

在短短几周内，普京先生摧毁了他20多年来一直在建立的国际化经济，以及俄罗斯作为可靠供应商所培养的声誉。现在，它被视为欧洲不可靠的、基本上不需要的能源来源。2021年，它供应的天然气占欧洲总供应量的29%，石油占35%。虽然目前它仍然是一个必要的供应商，但其作用肯定会减少。

通过大规模的制裁将俄罗斯从世界经济中解脱出来，这将是一个挑战。作为一个出口国，它主要是一个商品和原材料的供应商，在通货膨胀的时代，这些东西都不容易被取代。石油和天然气位居榜首，占总出口收入的一半，在某些年份，占俄罗斯总预算的40%以上。

现在冬季即将结束，欧洲的当务之急是确保明年冬季有足够的天然气储存，为此它需要俄罗斯的供应。然而，总体而言，俄罗斯对欧洲的天然气销售将在未来五年内大幅缩减。欧洲将加强对可再生能源的推动，现在是出于安全和气候变化的考虑。法国已经宣布了新的核电站，而欧洲正在全球范围内寻找更多的液化天然气（LNG）。

这个市场很紧张，但美国今年将引进更多的产能，使其成为世界最大的液化天然气出口国。欧洲将促进能源效率，但也会燃烧更多的煤炭，至少是暂时的。电动汽车的推广将加速。欧洲将需要加快对新的石油和天然气生产的许可。据估计，欧洲 "尚未发现的 "天然气资源相当于俄罗斯向欧洲大陆出口几十年的天然气。俄罗斯将能够向中国输送更多的天然气，但将被困在一个向西运行的进入欧洲的管道系统中，其运行速度远远低于产能。

在正常年份，俄罗斯石油出口的收入是天然气的三倍以上。但到目前为止，其石油出口的中断程度要高得多。在俄罗斯每天750万桶的出口中，约有一半出口到了欧洲。尽管这些出口被明确排除在正式的制裁之外（直到被美国和英国特别针对），但它们正被间接制裁，被买家、托运人和保险商 "自我制裁"，以及被银行极度不愿意提供贸易融资。现在，一个新的因素正在影响石油市场：因乌克兰战争而感到恐惧的公众舆论的力量，以及由此产生的对公司的压力，使其从俄罗斯石油中退缩。

这给欧洲国家造成了两难的局面：不购买俄罗斯的石油，以回应被乌克兰的破坏所激怒的公众，而整个欧洲大陆可能出现燃料短缺。普京先生认为他有筹码，在能源市场非常紧张的时候发动战争，以为欧盟国家会抗议，但会站在一边。但事实证明这是个严重的误判。目前看来，俄罗斯油轮每天的装载量减少了100万至200万桶，更多的油桶被困在海上，找不到家。

西方政府重新发现了能源安全的概念，正在全球范围内寻找额外的供应。他们应该在这样的基础上制定计划：要么对俄罗斯石油的排斥会增加，要么普京先生会挥舞 "石油武器"，削减供应。不管是哪种情况，他们都应该与石油和天然气公司更紧密地合作，以了解不断变化的物流。为了促进合作，他们最好抛开通常在价格上涨时援引的关于市场操纵的习惯性民粹主义语言。

这给我们带来了可替代性的问题，这个奇怪的词描述了用一种物品替代另一种物品的难易程度（或不难）。从理论上讲，石油市场将重新调整。不再运往欧洲的俄罗斯油桶将运往其他地方，主要是亚洲，而其他地方的油桶将运往欧洲。买方国家，如进口85%石油的印度和中国，将热衷于购买大幅打折的俄罗斯石油。但是，每天在全球范围内运输约1亿桶石油的复杂系统不容易重新平衡，并将被新的摩擦所困扰，如安排黑海和波罗的海港口的融资和运输的困难，以及新的制裁。将需要避开美元的双边支付系统，而且以物易物的方式很可能会回归。

由沙特阿拉伯和俄罗斯管理的OPEC-plus系统在全球化的市场中发挥了作用。但在一个更加巴尔干化的世界中，它将很难维持下去，因为各国将发现很难像最近联合国投票谴责入侵那样 "弃权 "选择立场。令出口国之间的关系更加紧张的是，中东国家将发现自己在亚洲市场上与价格更低的俄罗斯石油的冲击进行竞争。

西方公司在过去30年里对俄罗斯能源的投资受到了西方政府的大力鼓励，他们希望用经济基础来支撑后苏联关系，并在20世纪90年代初的海湾危机之后，为全球市场带来更多样化的供应。这些公司现在正在离开他们在俄罗斯的投资。来自新兴市场的公司将试图以低廉的价格捡起被遗弃的财产，同时需要注意避开制裁。俄罗斯能源公司现在被切断了与国际金融和技术流的联系。所有这些都将意味着俄罗斯的石油和天然气产量将减少。

普京先生以 "团结 "的名义发起战争，称俄罗斯人和乌克兰人是 "一个民族"，并将此作为实现其重新确立俄罗斯作为大国的宏伟目标的重要步骤。但他所做的，除了打破任何这样的团结之外，还破坏和贬低了俄罗斯最重要的经济力量来源。

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Daniel Yergin是《新地图》的作者。能源、气候和国家间的冲突》一书的作者。他是标准普尔全球公司的副主席，并因其著作《奖》获得普利策奖。对石油、金钱和权力的史诗般的追求》。